Polish Political Science Yearbook vol. 46 (2) (2017), pp. 190–204 DOI: 10.15804/ppsy2017212 PL ISSN 0208-7375 Maciej Herbut University of Wrocław (Poland) Renata Kunert-Milcarz University of Wrocław (Poland) he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century: the Eastern Partnership, Russian Expansionism and the War in Ukraine Abstract: While the scope of the paper is to assess the actions undertaken by the European Union towards the FSU-CIS (Former Soviet Union, Commonwealth of Independent States) which was manifested through the Eastern Partnership Initiative in the years 2008 – 2014, the focus will be centred on theoretical concepts and their ‘explanatory power’ rather than actions undertaken by European or Russian decision makers. Taking that under account, this essay will critically assess the explanatory power of the neorealist school of thought which although overtly criticized, still remains a viable tool in explaining the processes occurring in international relations. Keywords: neorealism; structural realism; international relations theory; Russian foreign policy; Eastern Partnership Introduction In the September/October 2014 issue of Foreign Afairs, Mearsheimer wrote an article titled “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” (Mearsheimer, 2014). he title is self-explanatory, strong and controversial. To what extent can we put the blame on the United States and its European Allies for promoting democracy in Ukraine? In 2014 after the overthrow of Yanukovych the new Ukrainian government signed a Deep and he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA), which envisioned economic assistance and institutional reform. (Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Afairs; Kościński, 2015). he Russian response to the aforementioned events were swift and resulted in the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and a prolonged conlict between Ukraine and the so-called pro-Russian separatists. he representatives of the structural realist school seem to have an answer to this question. hey claim that the incursion of the West into the Russian ‘close abroad’ or ‘priviliged sphere of inluence’ was considered a valiation of Russian raison d’état1. he main objective of this paper is to assess the explanatory value of structural realism. Although the theory has been widely criticized, this essay will make an attempt of defending its basic assumptions. Although neorealism/structural realism seems helpless when cultural or more complex economic processes are concerned, the explanatory power of the theory is of particular use when explaining the behaviours of the Russian Federation. he paper will be divided into three parts. In the irst part, the main concepts of neorealism will be introduced. In the second part a critical assessment of both theoretical as well as explanatory value of the theory will be assessed. Finally in the third, last section the policies of the EU regarding its eastern frontiers as well as well as those of the Russian Federation will be assessed. Since the paper focuses mostly on theoretical aspects of neorealism, these particular policies, including the Eastern Partnership initiative, will be of secondary importance. Waltz and Mearsheimer: he Principles of Defensive and Ofensive Realism he founding volume of neorealism was the heory of International Relations written by Kenneth Waltz. By drawing from economics, Waltz created a structural model of international relations which introduced a ‘method’ in comprehending the complexity of reality. In his theory Waltz focuses only on the processes that occur on the international level and omits those that derive from the national level (Waltz, 1979, p. 71). his attempt of simplifying reality and ignoring the actions of individuals or state institutions was overly criticized. However, such omissions were exactly what the author had in mind. He wanted to isolate, scrutinize and understand a reality 1 Adepts of Russian history today take the fact that Russia, as the continuator of the Soviet Union, will follow its footsteps and will not hesitate to resort to military power, just as in case of the USSR didn’t it case of economic and political changes in their satelite states Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. (Chafetz, 1993; horun, 2009; Goldman 2008, 152 – 153). 191 192 Maciej Herbut, Renata Kunert-Milcarz which other ways would be impossible to comprehend (Waltz, 1979, p. 10). In other words, Kenneth Waltz is not only the ‘father’ of neorealist thought, he established the foundation of macropolitical analysis in international relations which remains an indispensable element of IR inquiry till this day. Waltz’s theory of international relations was inspired by Adam Smith’s microeconomic model. Using Waltz’s words “Reasoning by analogy is helpful where one can move from a domain for which theory is well developed to one where it is not (…) Reasoning by analogy is permissible where diferent domains are structurally similar” (Waltz, 1979, str. 89). he main concepts such as ‘international structure’, ‘anarchy’ and ‘self-help’ were directly ‘converted’ from the ‘microeconomic understandings’ of how Adam smith perceived his ‘economic man’- a single-minded proit maximiser. he diference however was that the ‘proit maximiser’ was not an individual, but a state which became the basic unit of analysis. States pursue their own interests and survival is their ultimate goal. In this pursuit they can mostly rely on themselves. Here we arrive at the to the concept of ‘self-help’ (Waltz, 1979, pp. 82 – 92). Anarchy as the ‘ordering principle’ in an international system is another central concept that assures ‘structural coherency’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). he juxtaposing of words ‘anarchy’ and ‘coherency’ may at irst seem to be a paradox. However, according to Waltz, anarchy refers to the fact that (just as in world economics), there is no central government that coordinates the domain of international relations. (Waltz, 1979, p.89). Last, but deinitely not least, non-state actors are not omitted in Waltz’s theory. hey are simply understood as agents which are instrumentally used to serve the purposes of their principles, the states (Waltz, 1979, p. 94). States can vary signiicantly in terms of their capabilities. However, their functions are what makes them similar to each other regardless of their size and wealth. In such manner states tend to ‘duplicate’ the activities of other states and show a strikingly ‘uniform’ way of behaviour in relation to one another. hus, what makes states ‘functionally undiferentiated’ is the nature of anarchy which prevents them from pursuing ‘specialization’ as it is in hierarchic/ national structures. Structural alterations may occur due to the ‘uneven distribution of capabilities’ between states. he relationship between agency (states) and structure is reciprocal. States (due to their capabilities) may inluence the structure and (what is a distinguishing feature of structural realism) the structure may also determine the states. In other words, structural conditions may either constrain or provide opportunities for states. (Waltz, 1979, p. 96). We can distinguish two main schools of neorealist thought. While Defensive neorealists perceive states as rational actors who look to their own security and restrain themselves from expansionist behaviours (Waltz, 1979), ofensive neorealists consider states as actors who will expand if ‘A window of opportunity’ appears he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century (Mearsheimer, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2001; Snyder, 1991). Summarizing the basic principles of neorealism are as follows: • the international structure is determined by the ordering principle: anarchy, • the structure is composed of functionally undiferentiated units (states) and their ultimate goal is survival, • states will refer to ‘self-help’ and count on their own means that will assure them survival, • changes in the distribution of capabilities between units are ipso-facto changes in the international structure itself. he Critics of Neorealist hought: an Assessment One could distinguish two lines of criticism. he irst concerns the applicability and validity in assessing the behaviours of states. he second, which refers to the value of the theory itself as a systematic inquiry. Concerning the irst point, both neoliberalism and constructivism are direct responses to the neorealist view of international relations. We will not indulge into detailed analysis what these schools represent. What we will do is present in what ways they contradict with neorealism. It is needless to say that to a greater or smaller extent both schools are inspired by a structuralist interpretation of international relations which means that: • analysed processes occur on the international arena, not beneath the level of the nation state; • the state is still the main unit of analysis; • both schools are (with certain exceptions) general theories of international relations. Considering the diferences between neoliberalism and neorealism, there are three aspects that are three points to be outlined: • the role of international law and international organizations, which according to the neoliberals are underestimated by the neorealists. (Baldwin 1993; Koehane & Nye, 2012). • the predominance of absolute over relative gains, which means that (according to neoliberals) states pursue the former (Powell, 1991). • the organising role of anarchy in which a greater variety of forms of cooperation occur than presented in the neorealist school (Powell, 1994; Baldwin 1993; Koehane & Nye, 2012). As to what distinguishes constructivism from neorealism: 193 194 Maciej Herbut, Renata Kunert-Milcarz • neorealism does not take under account cultural and social processes that shape international structures. Constructivists make this one of their central points; • states’ pursuit of diferent goals is conditioned by their particular identities and the unique way in which they perceive reality; • anarchy as an organizing principle is not materially determined as presented by neorealists. Each state may perceive ‘anarchy’ in its own way (Wendt, 1992; Ruggie 1998). To be more speciic, one of the most comprehensive criticisms of neorealist theory has been gathered in a volume edited by Robert O. Keohane “Neorealism and its critics”.(Keohane, 1986a). For instance, John Gerard Ruggie in his article “Continuity and Transformation in World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis, states that Waltz misses the main points which trigger structural change, namely unit-level processes (Ruggie, 1986, p. 152). Robert Cox in “States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations heory” claims that neorealism does not take under account “the human factor”(Cox, 1986). Richard Ashley on the other hand accuses neorealism of “ideological narrowness” (Ashley, 1986). Finally, Keohane in “heory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” by referring to key problems raised by Marks, Wallerstein or Gilpin, claims that they cannot be answered within a neorealist framework (Keohane, 1986b). A constructive and harsh critique of Waltz was also presented by Paul Shroeder in his “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist heory”. Schroeder rejects the theory and even closes his paper by “advising international historian students not to adopt the neo-realist paradigm” for the following reasons: Firstly, the central concept of neo-realist theory, namely ‘self-help’ is vague and unclear and would require a more in-depth explanation. Secondly, that the relationship between ‘self-help’ and ‘balance of power’ and the insistence on force in international relations is in general wrong because states (especially small ones) cannot aford to apply such strategies. Last, but deinitely not least, in international relations there are patterns of behaviours for instance ‘hiding’ from threats or ‘transcending’ which haven’t been taken under consideration by Waltz. (Shroeder, 1994, pp. 116 – 117,148) 2. Another problem considering neorealist thought refers to its central assumption that is its value as a systematic theory. Some authors, such as Inna Hamati-Ataya, Merton Kaplan or Bear F. Braumoeller claim that Waltz’s research cannot be considered 2 For instance, these could entail the adoption of diferent variations of neutrality (hiding) or attempting to ‘surmount international anarchy and go beyond the limits of conlicting politics by referring to institutional arrangements involving consensus and the application of international norms’ (transcending). he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century as systematic at all. While systematic theories should clearly deine the ‘boundary conditions’ of ‘the system’ as well as recognize the concept of ‘subsystem dominance’ Waltz’s research does not meet these conditions3. Such statement can also be supported by making reference to other systematic theories in other sciences. For instance, the concept of ‘boundary conditions’ is a major concern in the studies of Niklas Luhman and Ross Ashby who indicate that for a systematic theory to be valid the system itself has to be isolated from its environment4. Waltz does not even mention about the processes of ‘homeostasis’ or ‘feedback’ between the ‘system’ and ‘environment’. Another problem is that while systematic theories refer to the complexity of systemenvironment relations and avoid generalizations, Waltz’s theory is general in nature (Ashby, 1960, pp. 18, 29; Luhman, 2002, pp. 121 – 130; Easton, 1966, pp. 97 – 99). Following the observations of Kaplan, there is a clear distinction between general and systematic theories. While the irst, such as Newton’s general theory applies to ideographic information only and does not take under consideration the environment, systematic theories such as Kepler’s heliocentric theory focus on the relationship between the diferent components of the solar system and how they interact. (Kaplan, 2014, p.55.). Summarizing, Waltz seemed to mold the features of general and systematic theories which, as already mentioned, drew much criticism. 3 Inanna Hamati-Ataya states that Waltze’s “lack of speciication of boundary conditions under which his theory would hold precluded the formulation of any signiicant scientiic propositions” (Hamati-Ataya, 2014, p. 27). “Although Waltz acknowledged that macro and micro need to complement each other, his claim that his theory was a ‘systems theory’ remained pure rhetoric, since his analysis was clearly structural (or general as the term is used in economics) and incapable of bringing actors signiicantly into causal sequences. (…) If Waltz had understood systems theory, and if he had understood correlatives, he would not have made the mistake of believing that subsystem dominance was contradictory to the notion of a system”. (Hamati-Ataya, 2014, p. 30). Morton Kaplan on the other hand states that “If Waltz had understood systems theory, and if he had understood correlatives, he would not have made the mistake of believing that subsystem dominance was contradictory to the notion of a system”. (Kaplan 2014, p.160). In his research Bear f. Braumoeller refers directly to Walts and claims “that Systemic theories incorporate the entirety of the system; structural theories (as Waltze’s) focus only on the uppermost layer and “bracket” (that is, ignore) the rest”. (Braumoeller 2012, p.13). 4 Niklas Luhman in his book “Introduction to systems theory” in the chapter devoted to open systems on several ocations refers to such basic concepts as ‘equilimbrium’, ‘disequilimbrium’, ‘system-environment’ and ‘system-to-system relations’ ‘positive and negative feedback’ which are essential in systematic theory. (Luhman, 2002, pp.29 – 57). Ross Ashby introduces the concept of state-determined systems in which compose of an organism and its environment. Although in Ashby’s research the distinction between the ‘organism’ or ‘machine’ and its environment is conceptual and arbitrary, it has to be done (Ashby, 1960, pp. 36 – 41). 195 196 Maciej Herbut, Renata Kunert-Milcarz In defence of neorealist theory, Waltz himself, stated that the many ‘omissions’ in his general theory are intentional as taking under scrutiny too many aspects of international relations would result in the theory losing its explanatory value. Such a statement seems to have a certain degree of validity as even in the most complex systematic theories a model will represent a simpliication of reality and it is futile to identify all variables which contribute to its complexity. (Luhman, 2002; Asby, 1960). Being more speciic and referring to the ield of international relations Rosenau, Hudson and Braumoeller who to a greater or smaller extent refer to systematic research all concur that it is the ‘observer’ or researcher who in an arbitrary fashion decide which variables will and which will not be the subject of research. (Hudson, 2012, p.14; Rosenau, 2012, p. viii; Braumoeller, 2012, pp.28 – 29). Although Waltz’s structural realism makes attempts of explaining international relations by reducing it to general principles applicable to all states, there is no fallacy in doing so. As it was proven in the earlier sections, and regardless of what ‘systematic purists’ may say, Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism gave birth to macropolitical/structural or general studies in international relations which till today remains an inspiration which itself is an added value. As proof, even such critics of neorealism as Keohane and Ruggie admit that in order for a theory to be ‘elegant’. ‘clear’, ‘logical’ and ‘applicable’, it has to be limited in scope and cannot grasp each and every aspect of the international reality. Also, what both authors agree on, is the fact that Waltz’s model passes the test of real-life applicability (Keohane, 1986a, p. 4; Ruggie, 1986, p. 152). Europe, Russia and the Eastern Partnership: A Neorealist Perspective While the end of the cold war marked a shift of the world order, it were the representatives of the neorealist school who saw that the clash between the West and Russia was something inevitable and structurally determined5. Mearsheimer claimed that 5 According to Waltz “It (NATO expansion) weakens those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens Russians of the opposite inclination. It reduces hope for further large reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes Russia toward China instead of drawing Russia toward Europe and America. NATO, led by America, scarcely considered the plight of its defeated adversary. hroughout modern history, Russia has been rebufed by the West, isolated and at times surrounded. (…) NATO held naval exercises with Ukraine in the Black Sea, with more joint exercises to come, and announced plans to use a military testing ground in western Ukraine. In June of 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Kiev with the message that Ukraine should prepare itself to join NATO by the year 2010. he farther NATO intrudes into the Soviet Union’s old arena, the more Russia is forced to look to the east rather than to the west. he expansion of NATO extends its military interests, enlarges its responsibilities, and increases its burdens”. (Waltz, 2000, he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century the world order (starting from 1991) in Europe was bipolar with the USA and Russia as being the main antagonists (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 382). he author presents the Unitaed States and European involvement against Serbia in Bosnia in 1995 and later during the war over Kosovo in 1999 as evidence supporting such a standpoint (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 378). By refering to realist terminology, we may state that although during the cold war an important shift in the stucture occurred and the distribution of capabilities between states changed in favour of the United States and the West, the Russian Federation (which replaced the Soviet Union) remained a power to be reconned with. Also, with the rebalancing of the staus quo and the decline of the USSR a power vacuum appeared in the post-soviet space which was expliouted by the West. From the Russian point of view (if we look at the world from a neorealist perspective), the new situation meant a decrease of inluence and the neccesity to look to its borders (the application of self-help strategies). For the United States and its allies on the other hand, this posed a great opportunity for ‘expansion’. In other words, by refering to the way in which Hans Morgenthau understood the behaviors of states (which was later adopted by neorealists), while the Russian Federation pursued a policy of ‘status quo’ which was supposed bring a halt to the ‘westen expansion’ the United states and western european states followed ‘imperialist’ ambitions6. As p. 22). Later in 2001 Mearsheimer in his “he Tradegy of Great Nations” showed similar concers, More evidence that great-power war remains a serious threat in Europe arises from the fact that the United States maintains one hundred thousand troops in the region, and its leaders often emphasize the importance of keeping NATO intact. If Europe is “primed for peace”, as many claim, NATO would surely be disbanded and American forces would be sent home. Instead, they are kept in place. In fact, NATO has moved eastward and incorporated the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into its ranks. Why? Because there is potential for dangerous security competition in Europe, and the United States is determined to keep the forces of trouble at bay. Otherwise why would it be spending tens of billions of dollars annually to maintain a large military presence in Europe?” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 379) 6 Among many important scholar works of classics such as Nicolo Machiavelli and Tomas Hobbes it is the work of Hans Morgethau, “Politics among Nations; Struggle for Power and Peace” which is considered a foundation for the Realist school of thought. According to Morgenthau, there are objective laws deeply rooted in human nature according to which states’, just as humans’ goal is to increase their domination over others (other states). Here the concept of power which he saw as a “psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” plays a central role (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 14). Since power is understood as a certain “state of mind” it can be exercised through other means than military force (economics, persuasion, Ideology etc.). Morgenthau claimed that states do not abide by moral values and peace among nations can be maintained only by two devices, the self-regulatory mechanism of balance of power and the normative instruments in form of international law (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 9). What is 197 198 Maciej Herbut, Renata Kunert-Milcarz indicated, Russian behaviors, as a defensive stance against the expansion of the West perfectly it to the realist and neorealist concepts. he Eastern Partnership, although not being a military enetrprise, was perceived by Russian authoriteis as a direct threat to the vital interests of the Russian Federation. Just to provide the basic information about the Eastern Partnership (EP): the enterprise was supposed to encompass the former Soviet republics such as Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. It was devised as an alternative to the Union of the Mediterranean and provided a framework for cooperation which included free trade, visa agreements as well as institutional cooperation7. he EP was not meant to guarantee EU membership8. Huge emphasis was on put on ‘shared values’ of the EU which included democratization, the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development9. While from an ‘euro-centric standpoint’ (if we can even accept such a standpoint), the ‘expansion’ of the EU manifested in the EP was perceived (generally speaking) as an opportunity for Europeans, Poles, Ukrainians, Georgian and even Russians which was due to the strong belief that democratic and liberal values common to all human beings (regardless of the regimes under which they live in). he neorealist perspective did not perceive it in a similar manner. Following the words of Mearsheimer, “NATO enlargement, the EU expansion, and democracy promotion, wre the West’s tripple package of policies, which only added fuel to a ire waiting to ignite” (Mearsheimer, 2014). Taking Mearsheimers assumptions even further the United States and its European allies pursued an imperialist policy when a ‘window of opportunity’ appeared after the collapse of the USSR. To provide evidence for the statement that Russia perceives international relations by neorealist standards, already in 1993, there was a shifts from Gorbachev’s ‘defensive defense’ to ‘agresive defense’ doctrine which envisioned the use o nuclear warheads in case Russian sovereignity is threatened (Kipphut, 1993; Volkov i Balatsky, 2012; however (from the perspective of this essay) the most important is Morgenthau’s are the types of states’ behaviour in international relations in accordance to which countries can pursue one of the following types of policies: (1) A policy of status quo that aims at the preservation (defending) of the status quo. (2) A policy of Imperialism which aim is to expand. (3) A policy of prestige/demonstration of power which can serve either preserving or altering the status quo. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 21 – 22). 7 For more information about the origin, objectives and goals of the Eastern Partnership see: Council of the European Union, (“Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 2009; Wojna, Gwiazdowski, 2009, p. 30; (Potocki, 2012). 8 For more information see (Kapuśniak, 2010, p. 42). 9 More about successful and failure of EaP see e.g.: (Makarychev i Deviatkov, 2012; Stępniewski, 2012, pp.19 – 21; Gromadzki, 2015;Sadowski, 2013). he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 378). While Yeltsin accepted a more assertive multipolar (mnogopolyarnost) approach in international relations, a similar (and even more confrontative) stance had been introduced in the foreign policy concepts of 2008 and 2013 accepted by Presidents Medvedev and Putin respectively which outlined Russian foreign policy principles follows: • as American Unipolarity is disappearing a new ‘collective leadership of leading states’ is becoming more transparent; • in this new Reality, Russia has to secure its geopolitical position by accepting a more assertive stance; • in the world, there are power centres that should receive special treatment in the Russian security framework (Lee, 2010, p. 34); • Russia will not restrain itself from violating the independence of its neighbours if her interests are threatened (Chapter IV of the document) and any forms of interference made by western countries in general and the United States in particular will be met with a swift reaction (Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February, 2013, IV; Legvold, 2007). Although the neorealist school seperates the domains of foreign policy from the study of international relations on a structural level, in this particular case the documents do relect how the Russian authoriteis behaved during the last few years. Here we can even make an assumption that the publications of the Russian Milinstry of Foreign Afairs were a demostration of power (or a pursuit of the policy of prestige, following Morgenthaus types of behaviors of states) which, in this case were supposed to be a direct, stern warning to the United States and its allies that further expansion will be met with resistance (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 21 – 22). hus if we accept the realist standpoint, the relationship beteen the West and Russia is quite clear. Russia is defending its spheres of inluence while the West is expanding them. Both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer in the years 2000 and 2001 in their publications warned american and western policy makers from ‘expanding the borders of NATO and the EU’ too far to the east. Conclusions To summerize, nowadays there seems to be a lot of criticism towards strucutral realism. In some cases it is justiiable, in others not. In general, it is true that the theory: • omits processes occuring beneath the level of the nation states, • does not take under consideration cultural and simpliies economic factors, 199 200 Maciej Herbut, Renata Kunert-Milcarz • underestimates the role of international organizations, • does not diferentiate states in regard to their behaviours on the international arena, • treats states as rational proit maximizers. However, we should rememeber that all structural theories of international relations are general in nature and will always present a simpliied version of reality. David Easton in his classic volume “the political system” distinguished three types of theories. Firstly, there are casual theories: singular generalizations, that (according to the author) should not be considered as theories at all. Secondly, there are ‘synthetic’, or ‘narrow-gauge’ theories which consist of interrelated propositions which are designed to synthesize the data contained in an unorganized body of singular generalizations. hirdly, there are broad-gauge theories or systematic theories that make attempts of establishing a conceptual framework within which an entire disciplin is cast. (Easton, 1966, pp. 56 – 57). Once applying Easton’s distinction, structural realism would be cathegorized as a narrow-gauge, not a systematic theory. In the domain of international relations the closest to the third cathegory would be a sub-ield cathegorized as foreign policy analysis (FPA) which objective is to devise actor or country-speciic or middle-range theories that are centred around speciic foreign policy decisions under speciic circumstances (Hudson, 2014; Rosenau 2006, pp. 206 – 246; Snyder, Brook & Sapin, 2012, p.64). he question thus rises, do the obove mantioned arguments make Waltze’s neorealist theory invalid? Certainly not. As the main objective of theorising is to bring us closer to understanding certain phenomenon, neorealism certainly has its prominent place in the ield of international relations. If not for neorealism, the subield of structural IR theories such as neoliberalism or constructivism would never come to existance. As to the the acusation that Waltz’s systematic theory is not systematic at all: names are contractual and as long as the theory has explanatory power, the naming is of secondary importance. A diferent issue refers to the real life aplicability of the theory. Obviously, just as in case of Newtons general theory of gravitation, objects when confronted with a rich environment will behave diferently when under laboratory conditions. he same refers to international relations. Neorealism, just as neoliberalism and constructivism is a general theory which by no means is supposed to describe all the behaviours of states under all circumstances. In some cases, under certain circumstances neoliberal principles will be more applicable to a counttry’s (also Russia’s) behavioir. However, we can draw a general conclusion that in the case of the Russian Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union a neorealist understanding of global politics seems to be provisional in understanding the foreign policy decisions of the russian leaders. he Explanatory Power of Structural Realism in the 21st Century When the subject of relations between EU states and Russia are concerned, although strucutral realism presents a very much simpliied vision of reality, it does seem to be aplicable once explaining and even predicting the behaviours of states (such as the Russian Federation) which still have a more ‘traditional’ or ‘power centered’ outlook of international relations. here should be little doubt that it were the representatives of the neorealist school whose assesment of Russian foreign policy (as presented in this paper) to a greter or smaller degree, predicted the the behaviours of the Russian Federations. 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