The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Small States

Maciej  Herbut

Size matters in international relations. Owing to their unique vulnerabilities, small states have different needs, adopt different foreign policies, and have a harder time achieving favourable foreign policy outcomes than large states. Small states show a preference for multilateral organizations, because they reduce the power asymmetry between states, decrease the transaction costs of diplomacy, and impose constraints on large states. Small state security policies vary widely depending on domestic and international conditions. Despite the inherent disadvantages to being small, small states can compensate for the limitations of their size and exert influence on world politics, provided that they use the appropriate strategies.

Purpose This paper aims to examine the hypotheses of main international theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and the development of these theories toward the behavior of foreign policy of small states in the developing world. The theories of international relations, especially the realistic theory, face a theoretical debate and a fundamental criticism. The hypotheses of these theories are not able to explain the external behavior of some small states, especially those in the developing world such as Qatar. In particular, these small states do not have the elements of physical power through which they can play this role. However, they are based on the internal determinants (such as political leadership and the variable of perception) and non-physical dimensions of power to play an effective and influential external role. Design/methodology/approach This topic sheds light on the hypotheses of theories of main international relations, which explain the behavior of foreign ...

In the literature review to follow I will first provide an overview of the major efforts in small states studies, concerning most importantly the definition of 'smallness' as the area in which an agreement is yet to be reached. This will be followed by an overview of the scholarly discussions on smallness and power and strategies that small states employ to mitigate their material limitations, which have led scholars to question the concept of power. This raised the following question: are small states permanently locked into a power hierarchy which they cannot escape, or do they have a possibility to overcome their material limitations by shaping and reshaping relations in which they are found? Constructivists moved the debate away from structural variables and limitations that these states are faced with, and brought into the picture the small states' possibilities and different roles they might employ, thus bypassing the limitations emerging from the 'small vs. big powers' dichotomy. Theories of alliances, however, continue to picture the choices that are presented to small states as only two: to seek protection of bigger states or risk standing alone. Least work has been done on where and how smallness matters and where opportunities for small states lie. Future work should reflect if, when, and how 'smallness' is a factor in these states' foreign policies and their alignment politics.

Maciej Herbut The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Small States Introduction Modern countries are not autarchic entities and they are forced to interact with their surroundings. If we accept a systematic approach to international relations we can consider a working foreign policy strategy as a necessary prerequisite to establishing a symbiotic relationship with the state’s “environment” that will allow it to develop and prosper (Kaplan, 1975). While big states can efectively shape their environment, small countries, due to their limited size and resources, must accept a more adaptive stance (Elman, 1995, p. 175; Barston, 1973, p. 16; Shroeder, 1994, pp. 116–118). However, this does not necessarily mean that they should withdraw into isolation. On the contrary, small states do not have the luxury of remaining docile in a multipolar world. hey have to actively adopt such strategies that allow them to make best use of both their existing geopolitical situation as well as the resources that they have at their disposal. (Barston, 1973, p. 23; Ørvik, 1973, p. 29; Katzenstein, 1985). As a starting point in our research we must accept that “smallness” is indeed a limitation and the policymakers of these countries are required to take into consideration the following factors when devising foreign policy priorities: — since the international system is by its nature unorganized and dependent on the behaviour of a multitude of actors that constitute a “chain of accidence and coincidences”, unpredictability must be accepted as having an important role in the formulation of the foreign policy objectives of small states (Nowak, 2011, p. 257; Sałajczyk, 2000, pp. 38–39; Grudzinski, 2008, p. 62); — the behaviour of small states is not immune to domestic political inluences and since foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy, attention should be directed towards the harmonization of both domains (Elman, 1995, p. 211; Katzenstein, 1985); Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 162 Maciej Herbut — small states have to make good use of their limited resources- resources which may determine their position or even survival in a turbulent and ever evolving world order (Shroeder, 1994, p. 125). As both internal (innenpolitik), as well as international (structural) factors will be of equal importance, a framework for integrating both domains will have to be introduced. he application of role theory as presented by Kalevi Holsti reinforced by the works of Christian Cantir & Juliet Kaarbo, who added the concept of internal contestation to role theory, will provide such a framework (Holsti, p. 1970; Cantir i Kaarbo, 2016)1. Ater introducing role theory, certain “prescribed” roles that small states adopted throughout history, and which could be applied by either Georgia and Moldova, will be presented. In the last section of this chapter, an evaluation of three likely strategies, namely “becoming an ally of the West”, “neutrality” and “strategic patience” will be evaluated from the perspective of their strengths and weaknesses as well as the fulilment of accepted roles in international relations. Role theory as a framework for analysing the policies of small states. While the notion of national role conceptions can be adopted in the research of any state, it is of particular use once analysing the foreign policies of small countries. However, before moving to the theory itself, it is worth explaining the most important concepts associated with role theory, namely “role”, “role perception”, “role prescription” and “role performance”. According to Ralph Linton, “he role represents a dynamic aspect of a status. he individual is socially assigned a status and occupies it with relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into efect, he is performing a role”2. To John Wahlke, the concept of role refers to “a coherent set of norms of behaviour which are thought by those involved in the interactions being viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy [the same] position (…). he concept postulates that the individuals are aware of the norms constituting the role and consciously adapt to them in some fashion”3. 1 he idea of integrating foreign policy and international relations through role theory was originally introduced by Cameron hies & Marijke Breuning in their article published in Foreign Policy Analysis titled “Integrating foreign policy analysis and international relations through role theory (hies i Breuning, 2012). 2 Ralph Linton, “he study of man” (New York: Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 114. Quoted by Holsti (Holsti, 1970, p. 239). 3 John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson, he legislative system: explorations in legislative behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1962). Quoted by Holsti (Holsti, 1970, p. 238). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 163 A role is thus self-assigned and in some ways has to it the expectations of the environment in which it functions. Just as people can determine what sort of “roles” they want to perform, the same may apply to states. here are three important components of a “role”. Firstly, as Holsti claims, there are “role prescriptions”, which in short are the expectations of the international community in the form of “norms and expectations cultures, societies, institutions, or groups attach to a particular position” (the manifestations of the “alter”). Secondly, there are “role perceptions”, or the “self-deined” national role conceptions that are associated with the values and attitudes of a particular actor (in this case a country) who interacts with other actors (the manifestations of the “Ego”). Finally, “role performance” is the result of the confrontation between the “ego” and the “alter” which can manifest itself in the form of foreign policy outcomes that can either be successful or not (Holsti, 1970, pp. 239–241). his relationship between “role conception”, “role perception” and “role performance” is illustrated by igure 3. Figure 3. Role theory and foreign policy: national role conceptions and prescriptions as independent Veriables. Inspired by: source (Holsti, 1970, p. 240) Before presenting certain “prescribed” roles which can be adopted by small states, it is worth referring to the advantages of adopting role theory in the process of explaining the policies of small states. Firstly, as indicated in the introductory chapter of this volume, role theory gives us an opportunity of merging both “innenpolitik” as well as “structural” approaches to international relations in a coherent foreign policy analysis framework (FPA) (hies i Breuning, 2012). When looking at igure 3. we can clearly identify the impact of “innenpolitik” variables on the decision making process of a state (indicated by lines H=> B). he line (A) can be treated as the determining role of the international structure which (as an independent variable) may Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 164 Maciej Herbut also inluence the decision-making process. Foreign policy actions are presented by line (C). he unquestionable value of the application of role theory is that it can provide us with a framework for analysing the performance of a given country’s foreign policy (as indicated by lines EFD). Still, role theory comes with a limitation as it does “anthropomorphise” the state which means that a state is treated as the basic level of analysis without paying due attention to the impact of individuals, or other non-state actors. Such personiication of a state may present us with an overly simpliied or even false explanation of reality4. hus, for a more precise scientiic inquiry, we have to acknowledge that decisions are not made by states but by individuals or groups of individuals who have agendas of their own. his leads us to conclusions that the adoption of certain “roles” by states may oten seem accidental and the roles themselves may be subject to frequent revisions, depending on which group (political party, inluential leader etc.) holds power. Although Holsti does indicate that personality traits and individual needs do play a part in the formulation of foreign policy objectives in international relations, he does not elaborate in detail how the conlicting interests of groups and individuals are converted into the process of assuming of certain roles by states (Holsti, 1970, p. 240). he merging of role theory with the theory of domestic contestation as introduced by Cristian Cantir and Juliet Carbo seems to ill this gap (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2016). According to Cantir & Karbo, there are several dimensions in which “internal role contestation” can occur: (1) as a “disagreement between ego conceptions and alter expectations”, (2) “as a conlict between two role prescriptions for the same situation” or (3) “as a clash between the elements of the same role” (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2016, p. 5). However, as the authors claim, role contestation in the domestic political arena, where “actors with various role conceptions interact in the foreign policy-making process” is a surprisingly underdeveloped ield of study (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2016, p. 6). hus, in their theoretical model, Cantir and Caarbo identify two categories, vertical and horizontal, in which contestation can occur. While the former focuses on the disagreement between elites and masses, the latter indicates that there may be disagreements among domestic political elites. (Kaarbo & Cantir, 2016, pp. 175–182). he unquestionable advantage of merging role theory with the theory of domestic contestation is the possibility of introducing agency-structure interactions, where agency is not necessarily associated with states. Additionally, by focusing on the interests of inluential national actors, such as opposition parties, pressure groups etc., predictions can be made considering the likely future trajectories of foreign policies of states. As to this volume, the concept of domestic contestation has already been widely introduced in the second section of the book, where historical, cultural and 4 Most IR theories or ontologies, neoliberal, neorealist or even Wendtian constructivism, will provide us with a simpliied understanding of reality (Waltz, 1979; Wendt, 1992). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 165 economic features of both Georgia and Moldova were presented. Since certain aspects of internal contestation, especially with reference to the proximity of Russia (see previous chapters of this volume), have been widely covered, there is no point of returning to the topic in this chapter. It is thus highly advisable for the reader to become acquainted with the previous chapters of this book where the diferent “levels” of internal contestation have been scrutinized. For a better understanding of how internal role contestation may have an impact on the country’s foreign policy, an additional bracket (National role contestation) has been added to igure 3. on page 163. “Smallness” in International Relations Is “smallness” a weakness? here is a general agreement among scholars that small states have not received enough attention in the research of international relations. his is mostly due to the fact that not many small countries were able to survive in an international environment dominated by big powers. It is with the concepts of international law, self-determination and collective security, all introduced within the framework of Wilson’s thirteen points, that a small state’s independence has been recognized by the intentional community. (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 218–246). he Second World War and the Cold War once more brought power politics back “into play” which again limited the signiicance of smaller countries. As Holsti stated, “small states were mostly analysed from the perspective of rivalry of great powers” (Holsti, 1970, p. 235). his trend has been particularly visible with the development of neorealism in international relations, which to some extent omitted “smallness” as a feature of International Relations inquiry5. he irst question which should be asked is to what extent and in what ways is “smallness” a limitation? In short, small states are those which have limited capabilities e.g. material, human, geographical which has direct impact on their capacity of achieving foreign policy objectives (Barston, 1973, p. 19). In terms of security, they are thus much more vulnerable to environmental pressures (economic, political and military) than bigger states. (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 9; Barston, 1973, p. 16). While there is no point in indulging in a futile analysis of assessing what are the “objective” (eg. size, population, military power) limitations of small states, it is the “relational” power which is of more importance for our inquiry. As “relational power” in this volume, we will understand the capacity of the state to make best use of its limited resources so that it could “transcend” beyond its 5 One of the biggest criticism of neorealist thought was introduced by Paul Shroeder, who even discouraged students of IR from studying it as claiming that is “unhistorical” or even “antihistorical” (Shroeder, 1994, p. 148). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 166 Maciej Herbut “smallness” and be capable of conducting a relatively successful foreign policy. he issue of relational power has already been a subject of inquiry in this volume and in short we may state that it is the focus on the “qualitative” rather than “quantitive” variables of a state6. Using Joseph Nye’s concept of “smart power”, Michael Handel equates it with the “organizational capabilities” or “collective capacity for action” of political and administrative institutions which, next to “geographical” and “material” capabilities (territory and natural resources respectively), determine the strength of states (Handel, 1990, p. 68). Next to important “institutional” or “organizational” sources of “relational power” of a state, many authors see also the performance and high competences of the diplomatic corps as a feature which cannot be underestimated. (Dybczyński, 2014, pp. 127–133). Since limited resources of small states make them subject to shits and thus more vulnerable to “environmental threats”, a wisely conducted foreign policy seems to be of particular, or even “existential”, importance (Macfarlane, 2008, p. 110; Elman, 1995, p. 178; Stokke, 2012, p. 211; Katzenstein, 1985). “Smallness” thus does signiicantly limit the capacity of countries to act and puts them in the position of “consumers” of security rather than its “architects”. Additionally, as Elman and Jervis claim, small countries have both more to fear as well as more to lose, which is a constraint that makes the decision making process much more hazardous than it is in the case of bigger states (Jervis, 1978, pp. 173–174; Elman,1995, p. 176). However, although the options for small states are limited, it is hard to equate this fact with their incapability of acting independently. Empirical knowledge proves that that although smallness is a limitation, when wisely used, it can serve the interests of a country (Ørvik, 1973, str. 29). Firstly, in a globalizing world, lexibility is an extremely important feature. Being just “consumers” of security, smallness allows for a greater adaptability to the existing “status quo” since the smaller a state is and the less attention it draws, the easier it will be for it to adapt to the changing environment. By the same token smallness in many cases can increase the “negotiation” capacity of states which can manoeuvre or even manipulate within the political system (Dybczyński, 2014, pp. 191–193; Handel, 1990, p. 257). Barston claims that even economically weak and unstable small countries’ bargaining position can increase if a great power regards its territory as important. Specialization, internal stability and adaptability of small states Since all the three issues outlined in the title of this section are interconnected, there is no point in talking about them separately7. While during the Cold War, 6 Susan Strange’s structural power (see p. 21) or Joseph Nye’s “smart” and “sot” power (see p. 38) can provide us with ideas of how should small countries conduct their foreign policy (Strange, 1994, pp. 25, 45–119; Nye, 2004, p. X; Nye, 2006). 7 Considering specialization, it had been a question of debate in many scholarly works. For instance, the ongoing debate between neorealists and neoliberals evolves to a large extent around it. For Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 167 especially in its earlier years, states were rather preoccupied with recovering from the consequences of World War 2, over time, with the revival of their economies and the progression of globalization, the division of labour between states was becoming more evident8. As Keohane and Nye noted, the idea of “complex interdependence”, which in 1977 in their famous volume “Power and interdependence” was nothing more than a theoretical concept, became reality in 2008 (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. xiii). Considering the research conducted on small states, there is a consensus that specialization is one of the key elements necessary for their survival (Ørvik, 1973, p. 29; Shroeder, 1994, p. 125). In general, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the more specialization is a feature of international relations, the bigger the role of weaker countries (which can focus their limited economies on the development of a speciic branch). In many instances, with the progression of globalization, the “investment” in specialization seems to be a much more viable option than investing in armament. he reason behind such an assumption is that in a globalizing world, once countries start fulilling certain roles, others states (regardless of their size) consequently become dependent on them9. A small state which fulils a particular role (for instance a hub for trade or development, a bufer, or a transit state) will thus signiicantly boost its relative (relational) power and thus its standing in international relations. instance the edited work of Keohane “Neorealism and its critics” (Keohane, 1986). However, it is not about the existence, or nonexistence of the problem, but rather the degree to which it determines international relations and the time that we are studying. While in case of neorealism, Kenneth Waltz claims that states are mostly preoccupied with survival on the international arena, neoliberals claim that there is more than just the issue of survival in play. he diferences between neoliberals and neorealists had been associated with the role of anarchy in international relations (Powell, 1994; Baldwin, 1993; Keohane i Nye, 2012), the degree of cooperation between states and the relationship between relative and absolute gains (Powell, 1991), the role of international organizations and international law (Baldwin, 1993; Keohane & Nye, 2012). 8 Of course the issue of specialization and interdependence played a role before the end of the Cold War. he best example of this is the fact that in accordance to the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan, depending on American protection, focused more on economic development at the expense of upgrading its military capabilities. he Yoshida Doctrine became a framework for Japanese revival ater WW2 in accordance to which, Japan as an island should become a trading rather than a military nation. Economic considerations thus took precedence over military and political matters. For more information see: Bert Edströms „Japan’s evolving foreign policy doctrine: from Yoshida to Miyazawa” (Edströms, 1999). 9 Such arguments have been mostly raised by the representatives of the idealist and liberal schools of thought as well of the supporters of the concept of democratic peace theory, which is strongly connected to the concept of economic development o states. he already mentioned in the introductory chapter of this volume works of Joseph Shumpeter “Imperialism and social classes” or Emmanuel Kant’s “Perpetual peace”, are inquiries which explain in what ways do internal conditions of states, namely economic development in case of Smith and the impact of the political system- capitalism, liberalism and democracy in case of Shumpeter and Republicanism in case of Kant, have on international relations (Kant, 2006; Shumpeter, 1966; Smith, 2007). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 168 Maciej Herbut It is needless to say that the concept of specialization cannot develop without due attention to economic and institutional stability10. Miriam Elman, introduced a two-step institutional model (Figure 4.) in which she suggested that foreign policy behaviours can only be explained within the context of the existing institutional coniguration of a state (Elman, 1995, p. 187). Although (especially in case of emerging states) institutional development can be a reaction to external circumstances, “institutional choices” shape foreign policy priorities in later periods (Elman, 1995, p. 217)11. Since there has to be a compatibility of the domestic institutional order with the societally accepted rules which can afect the domain of foreign policy, the establishment of a particular institutional order is a lasting decision that will have effects on the future of a state. (Elman, 1995, pp. 186–187)12. What is also an important feature in Elman’s model is that the author makes a distinction between “politics in crisis” and “politics in normal times” which in this research seems to be of great importance since both Georgia and Moldova are in crisis and the institutional choices of today will have an impact on these countries’ future (Elman, 1995, p. 187). Finally, ater focusing on theoretical concepts, it is worth presenting some examples of successful small states policies which managed to overcome their “smallness”. Peter Katzenstein in his book titled “Small states in world markets” by focusing on the examples of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, demonstrated how institutional stability reinforced by economic lexibility and specialization assured these small states’ prosperity and development. (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 9). Katzenstein’s work focused mostly on two common features of the aforementioned states, namely “democratic corporatism” and “lexible adjustment” based on “domestic compensation”. “Democratic corporatism” is distinguished by three traits: irstly an ideology of partnership expressed at the national level, which is not based on “cultural cohesion” but rather on the acceptance and the embracement of “cultural diferentiation” that prevents open hostilities between diferent groups; secondly, a centralized 10 here is no panacea, in terms of which type of government is more suitable for stability of states in general and those of small states’ policies in detail. Still, Rosenau’s clusters of “genotypic variables” such as “size”, “role of the government” “openness of the regime” the “levels of development of states” or comparative politics in which presidentialism will be confronted with parliamentalism, can only be a starting point in such research which can provide us with an idea how diferent types of government can have impact on the development of states (Rosenau, 1966). 11 For instance: some scholars, such as Waltz or Barston state that small countries would look more into internal and regional considerations (Waltz, 1979, p. 79; Barston, 1973, p. 16). Others, for instance Rosenau will claim that small states, which will have to be more preocupied with survival, will have to be more sensitive to the changes in the international system (Rosenau, 1966, pp. 47–48). he issue has been widely debated by Elman in his article “he foreign policies of small states: Challenging neorealism in its own backyard” (Elman, 1995, pp. 172–176). 12 his sociological process was also presented by Nicholas Onuf, in his “Making sense, making world, constructivism in social theory and international relations” according to whom the creation of institutions, a manifestation of certain rules, are or (should be) a result of a social habitus (Onuf, 2013). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 169 Figure 4. Domestic politics and foreign policy: a two-step institutional model. Source (Elman, 1995, p. 188) and concentrated system of interest groups that prevents the process of “crowding of public agendas”, which may result in uncontrolled manifestations and social unrest13; thirdly, conlicting objectives are coordinated through a continuous process of political bargaining between interest groups, state bureaucracies and political parties. (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 88–92). In addition to the above means of public bargaining comes the multiparty parliamental democratic system which further reinforces the indicated above informal arrangements. (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 34). he term “lexible adjustment” (also introduced by Katzenstein), which derives from the necessity of constant harmonization of internal arrangements with external pressures, is a direct reaction to the limitations that small states have to confront. As protectionist policies lead to the increase of the prices of intermediate goods, undermine the competitiveness of exports, and eventually may trigger economic retaliation from larger and less vulnerable states, small countries do not have the luxury of escaping into protectionism. his means that they have to embrace liberalization, along with its unquestionable limitations and try and compensate this threat by lowering economic barriers and establishing favourable economic arrangements (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 40). Additionally, as dealing with the negative aspects of economic liberalization poses a challenge, the politics of “domestic compensation” in the form of a variety of interventionist and domestic policies (eg. inancial compensations by releasing investment reserve funds in times of crisis, the control of the labour market or subsidising small irms) comes into play. (Katzenstein, 1985, pp. 47–49). Katzenstein’s research is an important addition to the study of small states and indicates the importance of both institutions as well as the capacity of adapting to the changing environment. However, as the author claims himself, he focuses on consolidated democracies which function in a relatively stable international environment and their policies are the result of long historical, cultural and economic processes. he same cannot be said of either Georgia or Moldova. 13 Of course, the prioritization of certain groups over other does introduce a degree of hierarchy and the problem of representation. However, this is considered as a lesser evil. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 170 Maciej Herbut Still, the experience of the aforementioned states and the policies which they adopt should be the subject of research of both Moldovan and Georgian policy makers. Another example of successful small-state policymaking is Finland. What makes this small Scandinavian state special (especially for this research) is its proximity to Russia. Finland, just like Georgia, had a troubled relationship with its larger neighbour and had to adapt to this problematic situation. he policy of “inlandisation” was an ambitious attempt at strengthening this small country’s geopolitical position by adapting a strategy of balancing between the super powers. he success of this small Scandinavian state is a result of the harmonization of domestic institutional arrangements to the international reality. In this case however, the concept of “lexible adjustment” was manifested diferently. Although similar to Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands, Finland prioritized its economic development: in this case it came at a cost. Finland in 1948 signed a treaty of cooperation with the Soviet Union, which signiicantly limited it’s foreign policy options (Maude, 1976, p. 12). Additionally, democratic liberties and the freedom of the press were limited by the authorities for the sole purpose of bettering the relationship with its bigger neighbour (Kirchick, 2014). Although the policy of “inlandization” came at a high cost, the economic openness (also to the Soviet Union) allowed the country to develop and prosper. However, what cannot be overlooked is that the successes of the Finnish policy were a result of both the capabilities of the Finnish diplomatic corps and the personal involvement of president Urho Kekkonen14 to build a working relationship with the Soviet leadership, as well as the stability and predictability of the country’s institutions, which again brings forth the question of applicability of the model to the Georgian and Moldovan realities. Summarizing, when it comes to “smallness” and the question of survivability, the following points have to be outlined. First of all, that both spheres, internal and international, mutually inluence each other. he internal institutional arrangements should it the structural constraints which are visible in the earlier given examples. In the case of countries functioning in a relatively stable environment (Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland), a multi-party system, which is a relection of the corporatist institutional political framework, seems to allow for lexibility and adaptability. Finland during the Cold War (which also was capable of adapting its institutional arrangements) needed strong presidentialism, and the restraining of freedom of expression which aimed at limiting the potential anti-Russian sentiments, was a direct reactions to environmental challenges. On the other side, foreign policy arrangements should be motivated by domestic requirements which is especially visible in small states’ 14 he speaches of Urho Kekkonen have been gathered in the volume: Dr. Urho Kekkonnen, “Neutrality: he Finnish Position” (Kekkonnen, 1970). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 171 ability to minimise the downsides which derive from the size of the country. In the case of all the earlier mentioned small states, the focus seems to be on economic considerations15. Secondly, small states, and this is especially visible in the case of Finland, should rely on a competent, well trained and lexible diplomatic corps. hirdly, which actually is connected to the above mentioned points, small states should heavily rely on sot-power strategies rather than those based on the use or threat of use of military force. he investment in the military sector in many instances may actually turn out to have unexpected consequences as it can result in the redirecting of the already limited resources from the economic to the military sector, and lead to economic, political or (as the worst scenario) military retaliation which small countries that face enemies of superior size and capabilities cannot simply aford. The application of role theory in international relations Before we move to policies of Georgia and Moldova a few more issues should be explained. Firstly, there is a diference between accepting a strategy and accepting a role. Henry Mintzberg deines strategy as a “set of guidelines that determines decisions into the future (…) which are (a) explicit, (b) developed consciously and purposefully, and (c) made in advance of the speciic decisions to which it applies (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 935). Harold and Margaret Sprout on the other hand refer to “strategic conditions” which are “adjudged by a particular analyst, to be the most important, or consequential to the given event, or probably so.” (Sprout & Sprout, 1965, pp. 160–161). When comparing concepts of “strategy” and “role”, one should indicate that both are indeed “self-deined” and “self-devised”. he diference however is in the perspective. While the former relects the interests and expectations of the country which adopts a certain “stance” in international relations, the latter represents a rather sociological relation in which others (in this case states) perceive a particular “stance”. Consequently a strategy may allow the country to fulil a certain role in international relations and the role may lead to an adoption of a certain strategy, but the opposite may also be true. A strategy may prevent a country from fulilling a certain role and the adoption of a certain role may be incompatible with an accepted strategy. Additionally, one should not forget that due to constant changes in the international environment as well as shits in a political system of a given state, roles can be revised on both the declarative level of the “Ego” as well as on the expectations of the international community towards a given role (changes on the level of the “Alter”). In other words, the relationship 15 While, in the case of small European states that were the subject of study of Katzenstein which simply cannot aford the luxury of adapting protectionist policies in times of crisis, in the case of Finland, the Finno-Soviet treaty seems to irst and foremost aim at coming to terms with bigger and stronger neighbours. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 172 Maciej Herbut between the declared roles, as well as the strategies of states which are manifested in foreign policy behaviours, should be a subject of constant adjustment and (if necessary) reinterpretation. Since roles and strategies are self-deined, there is a huge variety of roles and strategies that countries can adopt. For instance, the terms “inlandization” or “armed neutrality” have been associated with particular behaviours of particular states. While the irst, self-explanatory, was associated with the policies of Finland during the cold war, the latter is related to the behaviours of Switzerland and Sweden in different historical periods. Another important issue which is not to be overlooked is the capacity of a state to enforce certain roles and successfully implement strategies of their own making. While bigger states can deine their roles in the international system and adequately couple them with strategies that will allow them to fulil these roles, smaller countries do not have such a luxury. An example can be the policy of containment (also known as the Truman doctrine) accepted by the United States ater World War II, which we may consider as fulilling the role of “the defender of democratic and liberal values” or the “protagonist of communism”. he role as well as the strategy was “enforced” by one of the super powers (in this case the United States) upon the international community and had huge global consequences. he aforementioned policy of “inlandization” which can be associated with a role of “a non-involved”, “neutral” or even “a bridge” (depending on the timeframe) between the East and the West, although successful, was more a matter of necessity, rather than choice. Summarising, there are a variety of roles and strategies and naming them is of secondary importance. What is important is the compatibility between the declared strategy and role as well as their applicability in a particular international context. However, before focusing on the roles and strategies of Georgia and Moldova, it is worth introducing some prescribed roles and strategies which these small countries could adopt. For instance while Paul Schroeder in his article “Historical reality vs. neorealist theory” presented a host strategies that may be adopted by states. he already mentioned Kalevi Holsti (the precursor of the aplication of role theory in the domain of international relations) on the other hand, introduced a variety of roles that countries can fulill. “strategies” and “roles” can be faired from the perspective of their compatibility. In both cases, only examples suitable for the study of policies of small states will be introduced. Paul Schroeder, distinguished the following strategies that can be adopted by small states: — hiding from threats — a state can withdraw into isolation, assume a defensive stance, and hope that “the storm will end soon”. States on one, or both sides, of a quarrel can be approached to guarantee one’s safety, or the protection of a stronger state can be sought in exchange for diplomatic service or support; Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 173 — transcending — attempting to surmount international anarchy and go beyond the normal limits of conlictual politics to actively solve a problem by engaging in some institutional arrangements, building consensus or formal agreements on norms, rules or procedures; — bandwagoning — joining the stronger side for protection and payofs, even if this means a certain sacriice of independence; — self-help — a strategy of balancing and engaging in alliances against an actual or potential hegemon (according to Schroeder, a risky and uncommon strategy adopted by smaller states). By adopting this strategy states oten completely rely on another country’s protection (Shroeder, 1994, pp. 116–118). Shroeder’s theory is particularly useful for the assessment of strategies adopted by countries of the FSU-CIS region. he analysis of Georgian and Moldovan foreign policies indicates that in diferent periods of time these countries have adopted a variety of stances. From the late 90s and early 2000s a multivector policy was implemented that combined hiding from threats and bandwagoning. Later on, when ties with Europe and the United States were strengthened, there was a tendency to adopt self-help strategies with the intention of limiting and isolating Russian inluence. In the case of Georgia this shit was introduced with the ascendancy of Saakashvili. Moldova began this transition with the signing of the 2014 DCFTA agreement (European Council). In both cases attempts to join western integration structures such as NATO and the European Union had been met with a hostile Russian reaction. However, with the failure of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative and the loosening of ties with Europe, the governments of Georgia and Moldova once more have adopted a more conciliatory approach towards their powerful neighbour. Transcending strategies were rarely used as both countries, due to their weak political systems and internal instability as well as international issues (the inluence of Russia on the separatist regions of Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) obstruced any attempts at devising more active political roles in the region. Transcending strategies thus can be adopted by small states which have both stable institutions as well as do not face any immediate international threats. Kalevi Holsti in his “National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy” introduced over 17 diferent roles that can be adopted by states in the international system (Holsti, 1970, pp. 266–272). However, for the purpose of this research, only those which can be adopted by small countries will be presented and these are as follows: — mediator-integrator — a role in which the state gets involved in resolving disputes between other states or groups of states and helps adversaries to reconcile their diferences; — developer — a role suitable for a small country that would like to overcome its “smallness” by playing some part in the broader human arena and assisting underdeveloped countries; Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 174 Maciej Herbut — bridge — a function that can be assumed by a small state that could be a conveyor or translator of messages between peoples, states and diferent cultures; — faithful ally — a small state too small to defend itself that is willing to overcome its weaknesses by joining one of the competing military or political blocs; — independent — a role which airms the commitment to the policy of non-alignment; the government will make policy decisions according to the state’s own interests rather than support the objectives of other states; — example — a national role conception that emphasizes the importance of promoting prestige and gaining inluence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies; — isolate — he national role of the isolate demands a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety; — protectee — some governments allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them, but otherwise do not indicate any particular orientation, tasks, or functions toward the external environment (Holsti, 1970, pp. 266–272). In general we can deine strategies as active or passive. he roles of a protectee, isolate and independent place a country in the of position of an observer, or a “consumer” of the international system, while the roles of a mediator-integrator, developer, bridge and faithful ally describe a more active role. A careful observer can conclude that states that are capable of adopting more active policies are those which also have the capacity to “transcend” (Shroeder). In terms of selecting “roles” and “strategies”, an interesting research has been conducted by Maurice A. East, who in his paper “Size and foreign policy behaviour: A test of two models” presented the following “guidelines” for small states which should present: — a low level of participation in world afairs. For small states their “smallness” could be seen as an opportunity, and not taking sides in the afairs of major powers allows these countries to keep a low geopolitical proile. Small countries are oten too small for their voice to be heard. However, this voice will be remembered by those against whom it has been directed. Keeping a “low proile” may turn out to be the best option; — a high level of activity in intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s). Not taking part in the politics of big states does not mean being passive. On the contrary, small states should make attempts to “nest themselves” in regional and local afairs and be present on as many platforms as possible since that will signiicantly increases their relational power. Today in the XXI century being an isolationist brings less beneits than active participation in world afairs; — a high level of support for international legal norms. Small states oten serve as guardians of international law, peacekeepers, mediators and arbitrators. his too increases their relational power; Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 175 — avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecrat. he avoidance of the use of force does not exclude the strengthening of the army. However, small states should irst and foremost make attempts at improving their relational power in international relations. Overemphasis on the development of arms production may drain the already scarce resources that small states have at their disposal; — a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities. Small states should manage their limited capabilities locally and use them wisely, focusing mainly on building good relationships with their neighbours. (East, 1973, p. 557). Possible strategy options for Georgia and Moldova When considering the resources and capabilities of Georgia and Moldova, it is clear that their strategic options are very limited. We can enumerate three main alternatives for these small countries which will be taken under consideration: an ally of the West, neutrality/non-alignment and strategic patience. An ally of the West he strategy of becoming an ally of the West is a confrontational approach to Russia that, by participating in webs of alliances, would provide Georgia or Moldova the necessary military protection from its bigger neighbour. Such a stance would mean the acceptance of a strategy of self-help (Schroeder) and accepting the role of a faithful ally or a protectee (Holsti) of military and economic blocks such as NATO and the European Union. Additionally, it can be assumed that due to the policies of conditionality (as in case of the Marshall plan ater World War 2) and thanks to the “defensive umbrella” provided by the West, Georgia and Moldova could secure stable institutional development and trigger a swit process of democratization. It is noteworthy that this strategy would also allow the Georgian and Moldovan elites to utilize the nationalistic card in which the hatred towards a common enemy could consolidate the society. Being an ally of the West was a strategy adopted by Georgia ater the Rose Revolution and resulted in failure after the military confrontation with Russia in 200816. Since then Georgia has been adopting more conciliatory strategies towards Russia. While for Georgia, due to the homogeneity of the country and the general anti-Russian attitude of the society, being an ally of the West may still be considered a viable option, for Moldova it is not. Although sharing a direct border with the European Union, pro-Russian 16 For more information see “he guns of August 2008; Russia’s war in Georgia” edited by Svante Cornell & Frederick Starr (Svante and Starr, 2009). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 176 Maciej Herbut sentiments are much stronger than in Georgia which in case of conlict could be exploited by Russian authorities. Although Georgia does not have access to natural resources it plays a key role as a hub for regional trade and remains the only state in the region to have access to the Black Sea (Sandri, 2010, p. 100). his is an advantage, which could be used by Georgian authorities and an argument in receiving assistance from potential allies. However, one should remember that this geopolitical advantage cannot be treated as a panacea for Georgian problems since Russian “bargaining power” is still bigger than that of Georgia17. Another factor which could be decisive and increase the likelihood of the abandonment of Georgia (this would also apply to Moldova should it make an attempt to follow an anti-Russian policy) is that becoming an ally of the West would decrease the country’s economic capabilities in two ways. Firstly, potential economic sanctions imposed by Russia would signiicantly obstruct the development of the country. Secondly, a state of permanent tension that could result in a military conlict would most likely discourage foreign investments. A strong anti-Russian policy is thus extremely risky, especially ater the consolidation of Putin’s position in Russia for the following reasons: — both Georgia and Moldova can be considered as countries of the “nearabroad” and thus of privileged interest for Moscow; — being a protectee of the West may in the future place small states like Georgia and Moldova in an extremely unfavourable economic position which naturally would hinder specialization and economic development (see pages 168–173); — in times of strong global anti-western sentiments, joining the “Western camp” may negatively inluence diplomatic relations with states such as Iran that are in principle anti-western; — the asymmetrical relationship between Russia on one side, Georgian and Moldova on the other, is unfavourable for the two small states to exert their “relational power”. Any form of economic or political showdown between Russia and its small neighbours may have severe consequences for the latter (see the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008)18; — Europe, in the face of the inlow of immigrants caused by the war in Syria, the rising terrorist threat, the rise of populism and the war in the Ukraine, is facing a major political, institutional and identity crisis that will obstruct any forms of assistance for such small states as Georgia or Moldova; 17 he “unsatisfactory” conclusions of the Riga Summit in 2015, can be seen as evidence supporting such a statement (WP Wiadomosci 2015; BBC News 2015, he European Council 2015). 18 he example can be the ongoing war with ISIS in which Russia remains a key player and under certain circumstances small countries such as Georgia or Moldova can simply become victims of Great politics. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 177 — for the United States, a nationalist and unstable Georgia or Moldova may at some point turn out to become a “problematic ally” which could increase the likelihood of abandonment. To summarise, becoming an ally of the West and subsequent reliance on NATO, the EU and the United States for security may seem to be an easy path that would discourage Russia from following an aggressive policy towards these small states. However including such remote countries as Georgia᾿s or Moldova into the security framework of the West, would limit Georgia and Moldova’s economic capabilities. Taking under considerations the arguments used by Peter Katzenstein, we may conclude that undertaking a role of “an anti-Russian agent” would make the country completely dependent (both militarily and economically) on the United States and Europe. Neutrality Neutrality is a strategy of avoiding entanglement in military conlicts. his term was codiied for the irst time by he Hague Convention of 1907, and not only does it set down the duties and responsibilities of a neutral country, it also outlines those of the international community (Laws of War). Over time however, our understanding of neutrality has evolved and today there is common agreement that there is no one strict legal deinition. In practice, neutrality can be “customized” in accordance to speciic contexts and interpretations (Agius and Devine 2011, p. 269; Beyer 2011, p. 292). Looking at particular examples of international relations, each is unique, and making an attempt to devise a one precise deinition would lead to generalizations that would distort rather than clarify the term. However, we can still try and categorise diferent variations of neutrality in accordance to the bellow indicators: Legal terms. As Jessica L. Beyer claims: “Actors can be either neutral, de jure or de facto” implying that, while some states have formalised their status in international treaties or other documentation, in other cases there is no such legal framework (Beyer, 2011, p. 292). Switzerland and Austria ater WW2 are examples of states which conirmed their neutral status in their constitutions (Swiss Constitution 1999; Austrian Neutrality Act 1955), while Irish and Swedish neutrality is not relected in any formal documents (Jesse, 2006, pp. 11–12; Pashkow, 2009). Enforcement/timeframe. Neutrality can be a “brand” or “tradition” which becomes associated with a state and be either a result of free choice by the society of a particular country (Switzerland) or be concluded in an agreement between greater powers that aim to create “bufer states” (Belgium) (Kunz, 1956, pp. 418– 419). While in the case of the former we can refer to it as voluntary, in case of the latter it is enforced. Many scholars refer to enforced neutrality as “neutralization” Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 178 Maciej Herbut where a larger country has imposed this status on a smaller one (as in case of Austria ater WW2) (Widmer, 1989, p. 21; Jesse, 2007, p. 74). Both the Swiss and Belgian cases are examples of permanent neutrality which means that these countries do not participate in any foreign military activity. However, neutrality can be limited to a speciic conlict or to speciic actors in the international sphere. As a irst example we can consider the Turkish neutrality during WW2, the latter can be exempliied by the policies of non-alignment during the Cold War followed by countries such as India, Egypt or Yugoslavia. While permanent neutrality in principle rejects participation in any war, the Turkish or the non-aligned cases are selective and do not preclude these states from taking part in military alliances or other conlicts. Military/diplomatic capabilities of states. In more recent research an interesting approach towards neutrality had been described by Efraim Karsh who focuses on the “negative” and “positive” aspects of neutral states. In brief, while the former can be understood as the capability to “discourage other states from violating the subject state’s neutrality”, the latter refers to the “capacity of states to persuade the belligerents of advantages they might derive from the existence of the subject state’s neutrality” (Karsh, 1988, p. 33). he negative component therefore is strongly related to the military capabilities of states and Switzerland and Sweden are good examples. Historically Switzerland has been considered as a “nation in arms” that can mobilize one tenth of its population, more than any other comparable country (Habrook, 2003, p. vii). he Swiss military doctrine, labelled “armed neutrality” has a long tradition and dates back to the times of the Confederation’s struggle for survival in the fourteenth and iteenth century. he Swiss have relied on a combination of social policies, military tactics and the use of terrain to efectively discourage potential aggressors (McCromack, 1993, pp. 6–24). During the Cold War Sweden maintained a stance of armed neutrality by maintaining a large army, and creating a strong military industry which allowed it to efectively defend itself (Pashkow, 2009, p. 41). However, Switzerland and Sweden also focus on the development of the “positive” component of their neutral stance. Swiss “active solidarity” as well as Swedish “peace-loving neutrality” rely on humanitarian and cease-ire (peace keeping) operations worldwide (Pashkow, 2009, p. 41; Swiss Federal Dept. of Defence)19. here remain countries that, due to deiciencies in arms (in some instances voluntary), have to rely more heavily on the implementation of a pragmatic and efective foreign policy conducted by a capable diplomatic corps (the positive component of neutrality). In general, the 19 Under the UN Sweden participated as a peacekeeper and observer in many missions in the Middle East, Africa, Pakistan, East Timor, Georgia, Afganistan, Iraq and Sierra Leone. Switzerland on the other hand actively participates in the worldwide engagements of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and had been a cease-ire observer in Korea or Kosovo, Swiss Neutrality, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) in conjunction with the Federal Department of Foreign Afairs (DFA). Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 179 “positive component” of neutrality (Karsh) resembles the aforementioned policy of transcending (Schroeder). It is also related to the implementation of active stances in international relations, which can signiicantly inluence the performance of certain roles such as those of a “mediator-integrator”, “developer” or “bridge” (Holsti). Finland, due to it’s close proximity to the Soviet Union, has managed to transcend its limitations and devise an extremely eicient and pragmatic doctrine. he policy of Finlandization (as a “peculiar” variation of neutrality) has been praised by many Western scholars who see it a panacea for countries in the FSU-CIS and could potentially lead to a “balance” between Russia and the West. he term “peculiar” was not used without reason. From a legal perspective, the analysis of the 1948 Treaty of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed between the Soviet Union and Finland (a variation of bandwagoning), Finnish neutrality should not be cathegorized as neutrality at all, as “the very process of building conidence and providing reassurance to the USSR appears to draw Finland into dependence on the Soviet system, to make her an instrument of Soviet policies” (Faloon, 1982, pp. 4–9). In practice, however, due to favourable circumstances, a stable political system, and a pragmatic presidency, the country managed not only to preserve its independence, but also to develop an eicient and unique variation of neutrality. In summary we can distinguish variations of neutrality that can be divided into two components, the irst focusing on the method of interaction between countries or organizations (active/positive or passive/negative), the second focusing on internal/ domestic aspects of neutrality (defensive/open): — active/positive, defensive neutrality — this foreign policy stance exhibits a mixture of “transcending” or “bandwagoning” (Shroeder). Additionally, it can be combined with the roles of “mediator-integrator”, “developer”, “bridge” or “an example” (Holsti). A country taking this path would tend to rely on its pragmatic and active diplomatic corps rather than on its military capabilities (Karsh). When considering domestic policies, these countries would adopt an active strategy which would be aimed at defending the country from external inluence; — active/positive, open neutrality — a mixture of “transcending”, “bandwagoning” (Shroeder) in the international sphere. It can be combined with the roles of “mediator-integrator”, “developer”, “bridge” or “an example” (Holsti) and an adaptation of an active stance in international relations (Karsh). A “passive” strategy is adopted for the domestic area that would result in openness to cultural, political and economic penetration of foreign or non-state participants into the political system of the state; — passive/negative, defensive neutrality — the implementation of an active foreign policy oten requires diicult political choices and can sometimes simply be “too expensive”. Being a “passive” receiver “rather than an active player” may be the best strategic choice. Countries that rely on their military strength (Karsh) or are located far away from hotspots or conlict zones can adopt such strategies. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 180 Maciej Herbut Under such circumstances accepting a role of an independent (Holsti) or becoming non-aligned may be the best choice; — passive/negative, open neutrality — as in the previous strategy, a country may decide not to play an active political role in the international arena, but at the same time open itself up to cultural penetration by other states. A neutral strategy can thus (in general terms) have the following beneits for small states: — provide them with the opportunity to make use of their geopolitical “uniqueness”. Neutral states are not restricted by political allegiances or alliances and can thus “manoeuvre” between other countries (Stokke, 2014, p. 211). Georgia and Moldova, positioned as they are between the West and Russia, could beneit from trading with both sides; — provide small states with a variety of performing “active roles” in international relations as “mediator-integrators” or “bridges” (Holsti) and becoming trustworthy negotiators or arbitrators between the conlicting sides. Additionally, it is a commonality that neutral states host important international conferences or are hosts for international organizations. A recognized (not necessarily de jure) neutrality could also be beneicial especially in a situation of intercultural dialogue between the West and the FSU-CIS region; — in terms of relations with Russia, adopting neutrality could be tolerable to Kremlin and open up an opportunity to settle the problems in the separatist regions (Transnistria, South Ossetia etc.) and inally end the perpetual conlicts which prevent these countries from developing. However, neutrality does come at a cost: — in relation to small states that are situated in an unfavourable geopolitical position (with a strong expansive neighbour) neutrality may become a gamble, as it precludes the signing of military alliances, which could shield the country from potential threats. Following the observations of Elman and Jervis, when it comes to small states, unwise foreign policy decisions may be much more hazardous than in the case of medium or large countries. hus, there is no room for making political mistakes as these may come at an extremely high cost (Jervis, 1978, pp. 173–174; Elman, 1995, p. 6); — neutrality is more than a choice, it has to be well nested into the regional, local and global security framework. As neutral countries usually do not participate in military alliances, this makes them vulnerable to potential threats. According to Karsh “In the absence of solid components — circumstances, conditions, power relationship, interests, speciic political goals determining the fate of neutrality at a given time — it will in efect, remain a dead letter” (Karsh, 1988, p. 6); Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 181 — all forms of neutrality have to rely on stable institutions, cultural cohesion and internal stability. As Johanna Ranion Niemi claims, “European neutrals are successful stories — most are prosperous, stable and respected members of the international community” (Niemi, 2014, pp. 1–2). Neutral states strongly rely on internal resources and they cannot develop if the country encounters internal political problems, social conlicts or are struggling with poverty (Karsh, 1988, p. 4). his is probably one of the most telling arguments put forward by those who oppose Georgian or Moldovan neutrality and claim that, for these reasons, both states are simply not ready to take on a neutral stance in international relations. Additionally, Niemi claims that the support for neutrality should be a conscious choice of the society (Niemi, 2014, p. 2). Although Moldovan neutrality is relected in the constitution (de jure), this status is extremely diicult to sustain (de facto neutrality) due to the instability of institutions and internal tensions (Constitution of the RM; Stratfor, 2008). In terms of relations with Russia, a policy of neutrality could therefore make Georgia and Moldova even more vulnerable to Russian cultural and political inluence. Strategic Patience his term is commonly used in international relations by analysts, military experts or politicians, when referring to challenges to the West that cannot be overcome in the foreseeable future. It is a steady, low proile stance that should be considered as a temporary means to an end (Goodenough 2009; Adzinbaia 2015). In Georgia’s case speciically, the term has been used by Hillary Clinton who advised Mikhaïl Saakashvili “to have strategic patience on the Abkhazia and South Ossetia questions and that there is no solution in the short-term to the rupture of the two separatist territories” (Mission of Georgia to the EU: Press realease). Today there are many Georgian oicials and journalist who claim that such stance hase been accepted by Georgia (Fryer, 2016; Civil.ge, 2016). Strategic patience may thus be understood as an interim approach itting between becoming an ally of the West and neutrality. In many ways it is a hybrid of the two stances. On one side, it is a policy of self-constraint in the decisionmaking process (a feature of neutrality), on the other it does place Georgia in the “Western camp”. As to the beneits of strategic patience, we may consider the following points: — while neutrality would require a revision of national interests and much emphasis on the shaping of public opinion, strategic patience could occur without such modiications; — in comparison to the strategy of becoming an ally of the West it may be considered as more moderate and conciliatory towards Russia. It may also, in the short run, allow a certain amount of control over ultra-nationalist sentiments. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 182 Maciej Herbut However, there are certain weaknesses: — the success of “strategic patience” will heavily rely on the implementation of foreign policy and the competence of the diplomatic corps20. Minor mistakes in the conduct of foreign policies may have severe consequences; — it is a temporary tactic which to some extent may freeze certain reforms which could (if implemented properly) strengthen these countries’ geopolitical positions; — although more conciliatory towards Russia, it still is a pro-western stance, and may be considered as such, by the International community. Confronting the Ego with the Alter: Perspectives of role performance of Georgia and Moldova his chapter has focused on theoretical concepts which may be applicable to Georgian and Moldovan reality. Each of the presented strategies and the performance of particular roles introduces both opportunities and limitations in the conduct of foreign policy. With the reference to theories of small states and Holsti’s role theory, that can be treated as “toolboxes” it is possible to conclude that there are certain paths or roadmaps that these states can pursue. Out of the three, neutrality presents the biggest and most promising opportunities as it allows the country to perform roles such as “bridge”, “developer”, “example” or “mediator-integrator”, which provide it with the prospect of being lexible and focusing on economic development. As Katzenstein and East pointed out, small states in order to be succesfull have to make best use of their limited resources and avoid any form of hostilities which can occure in their neighbourhood. Additionally, they should be active in international relations and try and “transcend beyond their smallness”. It is therefore logical that, in times of globalization, active/positive variants of neutrality are those which can provide the country with the biggest opportunities. Becoming an ally of the West although may seem easier to adopt, ofers a much smaller opportunity in terms of economic development. Referring again to Katzenstein, East and Shroeder, picking sides for smaller countries can be risky enterprise as such states have to completely rely on their protectors. he assuming of roles, which can provide the country with economic and political opportunities, such as “bridge”, “mediator-integrator” is not an option for these countries. Additionally, the disproportions between small states and their protectors, as well as enemies increases the 20 Georgia and Moldova are countries that are relatively small and a carefully conducted active policy (even if it aims at integration with the West) may be considered as “tolerable” for Kremlin. If so, anchoring within western structures and assistance in building stable institutions may strengthen these countries’ position. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 183 likelihood of abandonment from the side of the ally. However, there can be certain beneits. Firstly, if the protector shows determination to defent its ally, the small state may feel safe under the “security umbrella”. Also, diferent as in case of neutrality, small states which assume the role of “protectees”, do not have to be dependent on the performance of their diplomatic corps as it is in many instances the protector which deals with the security issues of their smaller partners. In case of Georgia and Moldova, that have internal problems and cannot count on a competent diplomatic corps, becoming a protectee may therfore be an option. Summerising, neutrality is without doubt more risky, as the country has to rely on its own defensive capabilities. However, it can provide the small country with bigger beneits in an extended period of time. Becoming a protectee is an easier option for those countries which irst and foremost focus on security, however at the expense of economic development. Still close cooperation with the West does not neccesarily have to lead to economic stagnation. American military assistance, as well as European inancial support may foster economic development and turn out to be beneicial for these countries. In terms of role performance (depending on which strategy will be chosen) there are however two signiicant obstacle. Firstly, both Georgia and Moldova have problems on the level of role conceptions since their “ego” is still undeined which is a consequence of an ongoing debate considering their future. Under such circumstances, role performance is questionable as there is a high probability that due to shits in power and instability of institutions, both states would not be capable of performing the chosen roles. Secondly, the inconsistency of the “ego” will unavidibly lead to poor perfomance of the “alter” which means that the country will not be capable of meeting the expectations of the international community. In such manner, the risks associated with both neutrality (as being “just on paper”), as well as becoming an ally of the West (abandonment) increase. he problem with both, Georgia and Moldova is not only that these states are forced to perform “politics in crisis”. Both of them have weak institutions which are still in a formation phase. Additionally, the societal divisions imply that the institutional framework does not provide the ruling elites with the necessary legitimacy which further constrains role performance. Adding to that the fact that the the international community is facing several crises (rise of ISIS/war in Syria, immigration crisis, identity crisis in Europe), this further perpetuates these problems. Under the above circumstances, it seems that accepting a “low proile” by accpeting a "strategic patience" stance may remain the only option for both states. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 184 Maciej Herbut References Adzinbaia, Z. (2015). Russian “creeping occupation” testing Georgian “strategic” patience. Georgia Today, July 30. Retrieved from http://georgiatoday.ge/news/797/Russian-%E2%80%98Creep-ing-Occupation%E2%80%99-Testing-Georgian-%E2%80%98Strategic%E2%80%99-Patience. Agius, C., & Devine, K. (2011). “Neutrality: A really dead concept?” A reprise. Cooperation and Conlict, 46.3. Baldwin, D.A. (1993). Neorealism, Neoliberalism and World Politics. In D. A. Baldwin, Neoliberalism, Neorealism, the Contemporary Debate (pp. 1–25). New York: Columbia University Press. Barston, R.P. (1973). Introduction. In R. P. Barston, he Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (pp. 13–28). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Beyer, J.L. (2011). Varieties of neutrality. Cooperation and Conlict, 46.3. BBC News, Unrest tilts Georgia to Russia. (2015, May 21). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www. bbc.com/ news/world-europe-32795249. Constitutional Law on the Neutrality of Austria. (1955). October 26. Retrieved from http://www.cvce. eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/670aa09c-4d4b-451a-84f2-23f2f9c8cb06/ publishable_en.pdf. Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. (1994). Adopted on July 29, Art. 11. Retrieved from http:// ijc.md/Publicatii/mlu/legislatie/Constitution_of_RM.pdf. Dybczyński, A. (2014). Sojusze Międzynarodowe. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. East, M.A. (1973, July). Size and foreign policy behavior: A test of two models. World Politics, 25.4. Edströms, B. (1999). Japan’s Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa. New York: Palgrave. Elman, M.F. (1995). he Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its own Backyard,. British Journal of Political Science, 25(2). European Council of the European Union. (2015). he Riga Declaration, Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga May 21–22. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/21-22/. Faloon, B.S. (1982). Aspects of Finnish neutrality. Irish Studies in International Afairs, 1.3. Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation. (1999). Retrieved from https://www.admin.ch/opc/ en/classiied-compilation/19995395/201506140000/101.pdf. Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS) in conjunction with the Federal Department of Foreign Afairs (DFA) (n.d.). Swiss neutrality. 4th revised edition. Retrieved from http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/vbs/en/home/documentation/publication. parsys.0008.downloadList.9934.DownloadFile.tmp/neuteebook.pdf. Fryer, J. (2016). Strategic patience in Tibilisi. Liberal Democrat Voice, May 31. Retrieved from http:// www.libdemvoice.org/strategic-patience-in-tbilisi-50770.html. Goodenough, P. (2009). U.S. counsels “strategic patience” in Caucasus, but skeptics question what that means, cnsnews.com, September 22. Retrieved from http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/us-counsels-strategic-patience-caucasus-skeptics-question-what-means. Grudziński, P. (2008). Państwo inteligentne: Polska w poszukiwaniu międzynarodowej roli. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek. Handel, M. (1990). Weak States in the International System. London: Frank Cass. Habrook, S.P. (2003). Target Switzerland, Swiss armed neutrality in World War II. Massachusetts: Da Capo Press. Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14(3). Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2). Jesse, N.G. (2006). Choosing to go it alone: Irish neutrality in theoretical and comparative perspective. International Political Science Review, 27.1. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS The Application of Role Theory 185 Jesse, N.G. (2007). Contemporary Irish neutrality: Still a singular stance. New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua, 11.1 Kaarbo, J., & Cantir, C. (2016). Agents in Structures: Insights from Cases of Internal Role Contestation. In J. Kaarbo, & C. Cantir, Demostic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations (pp. 174–193). New York and London: Routledge. Kaarbo, J., & Cantir, C. (2016). Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Plicy, and Internaional Reltions. New York: Routledge. Kant, E. (2006). Towards Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Kaplan, M. (1975). System and Process in International Politics. New York: Robert E.Krieger Publishing Company. Karsh, E. (1988). Neutrality and small states. London and New York: Routledge. Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London . Kekkonen, U. (1970). Neutrality: he Finnish Position. London: William Heinemann. Keohane, R. (1986). Neorelism and its critics. New York: Columbia Univeristy Press. Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (2012). Power and Interdependence. New York: Longman. Kissinger, H. (1994). Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster. Kirchick, J. (2014, 07 27). Finlandisation is not a Solution for Ukraine. he America Interest. Retrieved from https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/07/27/inlandization-is-not-a-solution-for-ukraine/. Kunz, J.L. (1956). Austria’s permanent neutrality. he American Journal of International Law, 50.2. Laws of War : Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V); October 18, 1907, Chapter V, Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, he Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale School, Lillian Goldman Law Library. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ hague05.asp. Litra, L. (2015). he origins of foreign policy shits in Moldova. In A. Shirinyan, L. Slavkova, Unrewarding crossroads? he Black Sea Region amidst the European Union and Russia. Edited by Soia Platform. Retrieved from http://soiaplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/he_ Origins_of_Foreign_Policy_Shits_in_Moldova.pdf. McCormack, J. (1993). One million mercenaries; Swiss soldiers in the armies of the world, introduction. London: Leo Cooper. Macfarlane, N. (2008). Georgia: Risk and Opportunity. Canadian Defence & Foreign Afairs Institute. Retrieved from https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/96/attachments/original/1413689047/Georgia_Risk_and_Opportunity.pdf?1413689047. Maude, G. (1976). he Finnish Dilemma. London: Ebenezer Baylis and Son Ltd. Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in Strategy Formation. Management Science, 24(9), pp. 934–948. Mission of Georgia to the European Union and Embassy of Georgia to the Kingdom of Belgium. (n.d.). Clinton advises strategic patience to Saakashvili. Agence France Presse Retrieved from http://belgium.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=224&info_id=799. Niemi, J.R. (2014). he ideological Cold War, the politics of neutrality in Austria and Finland. New York: Routledge. Nowak, T.L. (2011). Polityka zagraniczna: Aktorzy, potencjały, strategie. Poltext: Warszawa. Nye, J.S. (2006). hink again: Sot power. Foreign Policy, 22.2. Retrieved from http://www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_sot_power. Nye, J. (2004). Sot Power: he Means of Successes in World Politics. New York: Public Afaits TM. . Onuf, N. (2013). Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in social theory and international relations. London and New York: Routledge. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS 186 Maciej Herbut Ørvik, N. (1973). he Norvegian Foreign Policy: the Impact of Special Relationships . In R. P. Barston, he Other Powers: Studies of Foreign Policies of Small States (pp. 29–61). London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd . Pashkov, M. (2009). Swedish security model: Peace-loving, well-armed neutrality. Razumkov Centre, National Security & Defence, 1. Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/iles/cat-egory_ journal/NSD105_eng_9.pdf. Powell, R. (1991). Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations heory. he American Political Science Review, 85(4), pp. 1303–1320. Powell, R. (1994). Anarchy in International Relations heory: he Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Organization, 48(2), pp. 313–344. Q&A: What does “strategic patience” mean in current context. (2015, March 19). Civil Georgia. Retrieved from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28150. Rosenau, J. (1966). Pre-theories and heories of International Politics. In B. Farrell, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Sadri, H.A. (2010). Global security watch: he Caucasus states. California: Praeger. Sałajczyk, S.P. (2000). Wizje rzeczywistości międzynarodowej. In E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar (eds.), Stosunki międzynarodowe: Geneza, struktura, dynamika, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwer-sytetu Warszawskiego. Shroeder, P. (1994). Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist heory. International Security, 19(1). Shumpeter, J. (1966). Imperilism & Social Classes (two essays by Joseph Shumpeter). Cleveland, New York: he World Publishing Company. Smith, A. (2007). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth if Nations. Meta Libre. Retrieved 12 17, 2016, from https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf. Sprout, H., & Sprout, M. (1965). he Ecological Perspective of Human Afairs with Special Reference to International Relations. New Jersey: Quinn & Boden Company. Stokke, K. (2012). Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy: Norway’s Peace Engagement in a Changing International Context. International Studies, 49(3&4), pp. 207–231. Strange, S. (1994). States and World Markets. New York: Continuum. Stratfor. (2008, March 11). Moldova: he neutrality gambit. Retrieved from https://www.stratfor.com/ sample/analysis/moldova-neutrality-gambit. Svante, C., & Starr, F. (2009). he Guns of August 2008; Russia’s War in Georgia edited by. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, http://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/vbs/en/home/documentation/publication.parsys.0008.downloadList.9934.DownloadFile. tmp/neuteebook.pdf. Szczyt Partnerstwa Wschodniego w Rydze, różne oceny rezultatów. (2015). WP Wiadomości, May 23. Retrieved from http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1356,title,SzczytPartnerstwaWschodniegow RydzeRozneocenyrezultatow,wid,17563019,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1154a1. hies, C., & Breuning, M. (2012). Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role heory. Foreign Policy Analysis(8), pp. 1–4. Waltz, K. (1979). heory of International Politics. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: he Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), pp. 391–425. Widmer, S. (1989). Forms of Neutrality. In M. Haltzel, & J. Kruzel, Between Blocks: Problems & prospects for Europe’s Neutral & Nonaligned Staes (pp. 17–29). New York: Cambridge University Press. Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy, 2017 © for this edition by CNS

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS

Log In

The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Small States

The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Small States

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS

RELATED TOPICS