Pa ge 22 9 The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justified by Precedent Phil Stilwell The grayish and elusive line of demarcation between science and non-science is dynamic, due in part to a dependence upon the justiication of precedent. Science has evolved to include heuristic concepts that have proven their worth by contributing to explanations, predictions and resulting technologies. One concept considered by some to be essential to the scientiic method has been the provisional epistemological assumption of methodological naturalism. This paper will examine the justiication for the inclusion of methodological naturalism within the framework of scientiic methodology by examining its worth as demonstrated through its legacy; the explanatory eficacy of naturalistic scientiic paradigms and the subsequent technologies that have emerged from its adoption. Its future value, as science advances into domains of inquiry evermore complex and nonintuitive, will then be assessed. The concept of methodological naturalism (hereafter, MN) has often been misunderstood, misrepresented and under-appreciated by the general public. Most academics stipulate that MN, also known as scientiic naturalism, does not deny the possibility of supernatural entities at work in our universe. A denial of this sort would fall under the more metaphysical stance of philosophical materialism(1). MN is a provisional epistemology and ontology that provides a framework upon which to do science. These parameters are merely provisional. MN does not entail philosophical naturalism, but instead requires out of pragmatics and precedent that science begin each particular inquiry with the assumption that any explanation will fall within the existing matrix of established The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 229 Pa ge 23 0 material deinitions and laws. This is the deinition of MN that this paper assumes. The justiication for this framework of constraint and the appropriate degree of commitment to it will be later established. MN also implies that, if a natural explanation does not immediately emerge from the inquiry, we do not default to a declaration of a supernatural cause. The default is, instead, an epistemological agnosticism that patiently and humbly admits a lack of evidence. However, MN may permit, under conditions that will be outlined later, a supernatural cause to be proposed if positive evidence for such a cause clearly emerges from a rigorous process of inquiry. Deined as such, MN is a proven heuristic that pragmatically disallows the positing of any one of an ininity of supernatural explanations for a given phenomenon, and, out of precedent, compels us to patiently wait for an explanation that will neatly it into the growing web of material explanations. For the sake of contrast, this paper will also refer to “methodological supernaturalism” (hereafter, MSN). This is the antithetical assumption that, if possessing the warrant of precedent, would require that we assume that a supernatural causation should be expected or allowed whenever we examine an unexplained effect. However, when applied as it is today without the warrant of precedent, MSN inappropriately assumes supernatural causation for phenomena whenever there is either inadequate evidence of material causation, or whenever the explanation of that material causation is cognitively challenging or counterintuitive to the subject’s frame of reference. An appropriate warrant for the application of MSN will be discussed later. The provisional assumption of material causation behind any phenomenon is actually quite recent to human attempts to assess material phenomena. From the beginning of civilization until a few centuries ago, the default explanation for any phenomenon that exceeded the rational or observational capabilities of the average human had The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 230 Pa ge 23 1 either a deistic or theistic basis. As the bulk of observable phenomena conformed to no known naturalistic paradigm, gods were invoked to offer black box explanations that lacked a mechanism and were tightly woven into a supernatural matrix of religious mythology. This supernatural matrix of mythical explanations served as the only available paradigm that could be superimposed on the perceived intractability of the observable world, and could provide a degree of ontological certainty from which one could then derive a psychologically satisfying sense of identity and place in the world. One can only imagine the unease of an honest inquisitive mind two or three millenniums ago. Apart from the intuitive physics behind simple levers and wheels, the ancient mind was compelled to generate, accept and perpetuate supernatural explanations, often in the form of etiological myths, for many mysterious observations. These mysteries included diseases, atmospheric phenomena, the dynamics of celestial bodies, the Earth’s foundation, earthquakes, as well as explanations for the origin of mankind. In this age of mysteries, MN had not the validation of precedential success, and had to compete with the psychologically and socially satisfying religious paradigms and their proclamations concerning the nature of the material world. These were, as Andrew White describes, “the long ages when mankind saw everywhere miracle and nowhere law” (White). At this point in history, an admission or even expectation of supernatural causation would have been entirely justiied for phenomena that were too far removed from the middle world(2) of the human senses and intuition. Microscopic or macroscopic causal explanations were not possible. The statement of Benjamin Disraeli “where knowledge ends, religion begins” would have been much less pejorative in those days of limited scientiic tools and a minimal corpus of established scientiic knowledge. At this time, both MN and MSN were of equal weight on the equal arm scale that informed ontological expectations. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 231 Pa ge 23 2 However, as natural properties and laws were gradually uncovered throughout the centuries and were offered as compelling alternative explanations, supernatural explanations began to dialectically fall away into the bin of abandoned myth. Material casual chains began to merge into longer chains and form a web of knowledge that informed subsequent inquiries. A new de facto methodology of naturalistic priority (Giere) emerged which held that MN eficiently constrained the process of scientiic inquiry to optimize resources and results. The ever-mounting discoveries resulting from the implementation of this new tool of science began to neatly fall into place to form a coherent naturalistic world-view, and conidence in MN promoted it to an fundamental heuristic in the scientiic method. This new-found enthusiasm and optimism in material explanations triggered exponential growth in scientiic knowledge and technology, and shortened the dialectic lag in the cultural acceptance of material explanations over supernatural explanations. MN is now integral to conventional science while MSN has been relegated to the mere hypothetical. Some of the more salient subplots in this historical process deserve closer examination. Prior to Aristotle, most humans considered the heavens to be clearly under the direct inluence of supernatural causation. Aristotle noted the regularities in the movements of celestial bodies, and suggested, in a manner characteristic of Greek idealism, that they were comprised of a ifth element called “quintessence” that, while being more ideal than the earthly elements, displaced direct supernatural intervention and posited that the heavens were bound by regular and predictable forces independent of the whims of the gods. This new theory provided an explanation that matched human intuitions concerning terrestrial physical forces, and was gradually accepted as an extension of the physical laws governing nature. Ptolemy improved upon Aristotle’s The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 232 Pa ge 23 3 theory with mathematical adjustments that offered greater predictive accuracy, and this theory dominated for centuries. It is necessary to point out that Aristotle’s theory did not entirely displace the mystical nature of the heavens, but merely relegated the supernatural to a slightly smaller domain of agency. During the reign of this theory, other more terrestrial phenomena such as disease and lightning were still uncritically attributed to immaterial agency as we shall soon see. While there were a few Greek philosophers who actually proposed heliocentrism, this idea was quickly forgotten or ignored as the hegemony of the Holy Roman Empire consolidated both science and theology into dogma that was only perilously opposed. At last, in 1543 Copernicus authored his De revolutionibus orbium coelestium outlining a heliocentric theory. The book was dedicated to the Pope and offered as a speculative hypotheses, so it was not until the subsequent century that it inally became the center of scientiic and theological debate, and banned by the Catholic Church. Fundamental to the controversy was the question whether God would place humanity in any location other than center of the universe as the current Biblical exegesis seemed to unequivocally suggest(3). By this time, the notion of MN as a justiied heuristic in the process of doing science had taken root. Scientiic advances such as the telescope of Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton’s law of universal gravitation began to allow for theories that extended the web of material causation far beyond what had previously been thought possible. As this web expanded and offered material explanations counter to prior intuitions(4) and religious dogma, excitement rose over the power and reach of science. No longer was it necessary to position God between the existing web of material causation and the next big question. Science could proceed to examine The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 233 Pa ge 23 4 any unknown with the assumption that there was a material cause behind it, and that this cause would, in all likelihood, be discovered. The realization by the clergy of the power this concept may be what led the resistance against the theory of heliocentrism. Threatened by a diminishing realm of divine causation, the Church, though the Holy Inquisition, sought to extinguish what they deemed to be heretical science. The brutality of this enterprise suppressed open support of heliocentrism among philosophers and scientists, and Galileo was forced to recant, was jailed, then placed under house arrest for promoting the theory. In the 1680s, Newton codiied his laws of motion and gravitation, allowing for even more precise predictions of planetary movements. However, it was not until 1741 that the church inally “reconciled” the theory with scripture (White, 70), Pope Benedict XIV authorized the publication of an edition of Galileo’s complete scientiic works, and heliocentrism was fully sanctioned. As the heavens began to look void of supernatural causation, astronomy exploded uncovering a vastness that exceeded anyone’s imagination. Each additional power of ten that our lenses brought into focus became another outer ring in the web of material causation, and each of these rings enlarged the precedent that justiied the continued use of MN as an effective heuristic in the scientiic process. Prior to Galileo and in the tradition of the Greek philosophers, thought experiments and the introduction of cosmic theories that appealed to common sense or intuition were considered adequate to correctly assess material reality. Galileo, in demonstrating the counterintuitive uniformity of gravity on objects of various weights, showed that intuition was perhaps not always a reliable measure of truth. His experiments demonstrated that less and less of the world was inscrutable, and whatever fell into this expanding domain of scientiic scrutability was irrevocably extracted from the diminishing The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 234 Pa ge 23 5 realm of possible supernatural causation. As supernatural explanations for an increasing number of phenomena were scientiically dismissed, conidence in MN also grew. Once the heavens fell under the jurisdiction of MN, other more terrestrial phenomena were divested of their superstitious explanatory cloaks, and submitted to the scientiic method. One such phenomenon was lightning. The early Christian apologist Tertullian had argued that lightning was in fact hell-ire and a messenger of God’s wrath (White, 252), a notion that other clergy later argued for by pointing out the accompanying sulfuric smell (White, 245). This idea persisted even into the 17th century in which Jesuit Stengel afirmed that the nature of a sin punished by lightning could be inferred from the bodily organs smitten (White, 254). It was in 1752 that Benjamin Franklin offered clear evidence that lighting was, in fact, the same force as static electricity. Due to the ease in which corroborating experiments could be conducted, and the fast implementation and success of lightning rods, religionists had no option but to withdraw to a position that lightning was, at most, the indirect hand of God. Embarrassments such as this caused even many of the devout to more fully admit MN into public discourse, and to allow science to reassess some of the more sacred accounts of supernatural causation that had been to that point uncritically accepted. It can only be imagined the horrors that an earlier commitment to MN could have avoided. In the middle ages, the default explanation for diseases centered around the wrath or mischievousness of supernatural entities. During the Black Death of the middle ages, “attempts were made in all parts of Europe to propitiate the Almighty, to thwart Satan, and to stop the plague by torturing and murdering the Jews” (White, 355). Millions of Europeans succumbed to the Plague, even as they attributed its cause to witches, demons, sin or the wrath of God. Had the default The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 235 Pa ge 23 6 been to look irst for a natural cause, germ theory would have quite possibly been stumbled upon at an earlier point, and in time to save millions of lives. On an equally disturbing note are the attributions of mental disorders to demon possession. Of those exhibiting mental disorders, “vast numbers were punished as tabernacles of Satan” (White, 528). Modern psychology arrived too late to save millions from social marginalization or outright cruelty. In spite of the enormous growth of science-based mental heath care, there remain today, in nearly every country, pockets of faithful who cannot relinquish the notion that irrational behavior is best attributed to demonic activity, and has no material cause. In spite of the resistance to MN, its implementation has led to an explosion of knowledge and technological advances. Once it was assumed that the material causal chain could be extended indeinitely, scientists enthusiastically sought to uncover those causes, then put them to good use in the service of technology. This exponential technological growth seen today would not exist had science remained mired in an obligation to consider or give preference to immaterial causes over material causes when confronting new phenomena. Attempts to reject MN in lieu of MSN are informed most commonly by a religion(5). This assumption of non-material causation for phenomena presently unexplained or having complex material explanations, can generate an endless number of superstitions, limited only by imagination. Some of these superstitions are relatively harmless such as astrology, relexology and psychic readings that only inlict inancial injury. However, others are less benign. Evidence that a blood transfusion or medical attention could save a family member’s life is rejected out of hand by some individuals based on what they deem to be superior knowledge gleaned from divine revelation. Others assert that AIDS is judgment from God, effectively dissipating any empathy that would The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 236 Pa ge 23 7 encourage intervention. One bizarre example is the practice in some parts of Tanzania of killing albinos for their body parts that then become talismans (Tanzania). Might the culpability for some of these cases rest upon religions and ideologies that disparage MN and the successful science to which it is a vital contributor? These few examples only begin to demonstrate the failure and culpability of MSN. From this examination of the history of science we have seen MN move from being equally weighted with MSN, to tip the scale in its favor with the enormous weight of scientiic successes. Contributing to this move was the pragmatic issue of resources. Were science obligated to address every non-material cause proposed, it would not get much work done. What may seem to be snubbing to the supernaturalist, is merely a pragmatic focus on MN’s precedent of success. Just as Kuhn cited the success of a paradigm as its only measure of value (Kuhn, 22-23), so also in the success of any heuristic employed by science lies its value. Whereas MN has proven its worth, MSN can claim little credit for the advancement of science. One heavily-discussed question that emerges from MN’s justiication is whether or not an individual can rationally adopt MN, and at the same time posses some degree of belief or allegiance to a supernatural realm. It does seems clear that a large minority of scientists do hold both beliefs simultaneously without suffering any signiicant cognitive dissonance. However, this probably more of a comment on human psychology than on objective logicality. Philosopher Barbara Forrest believes that MN does not logically entail a metaphysical naturalism, but that it is the “only reasonable metaphysical conclusion” (Forrest, 7). However, this argument is very nuanced and will not be addressed in this paper. The primary question that will be addressed is What would justify the acceptance of MSN? First, let us establish that this discussion is limited to intermediate supernatural causation, and the “irst cause” question The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 237 Pa ge 23 8 we shall leave for more astute philosophers. Intermediate supernatural causation (hereafter, ISC) refers to the positioning of a supernatural cause into the current web of material scientiic explanations. This ISC can be an insertion between material links, or an extension on the end of a material causal chain. This deinition inherently has the disadvantage of an ineffable mechanism. A mechanism might exist, but because that mechanism is necessarily independent of natural ontology and laws, it can not be articulated. For example, the neurological process corresponding to praying for rain must transverse some causal route to the immaterial mind of God, then return back via some mechanism to create material condensation and precipitation. This disadvantage does not immediately disqualify a proposal of ISC, but someone who submits an ISC hypothesis must give equal weight to any other logically possible immaterial cause suggested by even the most imaginative mind. From this we also see that the falsiication of a suggested immaterial cause is not possible. The mechanism employed by the immaterial cause must remain a mystery or its description must be accepted on non-scientiic faith. Therefore, this lack of a mechanism weakens the case for ISC in two ways. First, it reduces the explanatory power of any theory dependent on ISC by merely providing a weakly deined “black box”. Science gives more credibility to theories with more intricate explanatory power. Second, it places the mechanism out of reach of falsiication. The mechanism is inaccessible to critical analysis. A theory of ISC cannot be blamed for this innate weakness, and it does not falsify an ISC theory. However, to acquire respectability among scientists, such a theory must, at some point, set itself on the track of positive inductive evidence. How might this be done? The existence of even a single phenomenon that could clearly and consistently be attributed to ISC would have lent signiicant weight to the justiication of MSN in the early days of science. Because the hypothesis of lightning as divine vengeance was long considered to be a case of ISC, The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 238 Pa ge 23 9 let’s consider how that hypothesis could have been corroborated in such a way that would have taken it from the status of hypothesis to the status of scientiic theory or law. Lightning as divine vengeance could have been (and can yet be) strongly established in the following way. If we could limit the sample to a subset of victims such as smitten golfers to minimize confounding factors associated with lifestyle, we could examine whether there were a signiicantly higher number of smitten golfers who had lived their lives contrary to the well-deined mandates of a particular god. The higher the degree of signiicance, the more we would be forced to admit the possibility of ISC. This degree of signiicance must, of course, be established by competent statisticians, then submitted for peer review. If subsequent studies replicate the same statistical signiicance, it would justify the notion that ISC should be admitted as a possible cause for this particular phenomenon. This alone, however, would not justify the adoption of MSN. Only if a signiicant number of new questions across several domains of inquiry were answered with coherent ISC explanations would we be compelled to move away from MN towards MSN. Clearly there are no shortcuts in the redemption of MSN. A single case of apparent ISC, even if very strong, cannot justiiably overturn MN in a day. An ISC claim would be scrutinized by the whole of the scientiic community and be subject to replication. If successfully replicated, the concept of ISC could then be taken more seriously in other domains of scientiic inquiry. If other cases of ISC in other domains could be, in like manner, established as signiicant, this would justiiably lead to the conventional adoption of ISC as a plausible cause for subsequent inquiries by the scientiic community. This is based on the assumption that intellectual integrity is what drives the average scientist to do science rather than loyalty to particular ideology. Only at the risk of one’s reputation would a mainstream scientist deny the possibility of ISC The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 239 Pa ge 24 0 in the face of an enormous growing body of evidence. If this trend in the success of supernatural hypotheses were to continue over time, the assumption of MSN would begin to rise in importance as a heuristic in scientiic methodology as MN would be, at the same time, increasingly marginalized. However, in returning to our original example of smitten golfers, if no signiicant difference is found between the subgroups that would corroborate the hypothesis of divine vengeance, this not only strengthens our commitment to MN since the natural explanation invokes the impersonal and material nature of electricity, but it also serves to falsify as a counter example any claim that a particular god will smite evil-doers more than the righteous. This consideration of lightning as divine vengeance is just one example. However all ISC claims made by a religion or ideology are subject to direct scientiic examination, and are not eligible for any special status that would exempt them from scrutiny. Recently, there has been a surge in scientiic studies examining ISC claims, especially on the question of the eficacy of intercessory prayer for the inirmed (Byrd/Tessman). If there emerges a clear correlation between prayer and precise predictions of recovery under rigorous testing conditions, this could then be possibly strengthened to establish causation. However, if there is no correlation as predicted, the hypothesis should be dismissed and granted no special immunity to criticism simply because it lies within the sanctity of religious dogma. A list of common religious claims that, to some degree, fall within the realm of scientiic scrutiny are as follows. • • • • • Intercessory prayer works for true believers. Miracles can be produced by true believers. Greater wisdom is granted to true believers. Greater power over human appetites is granted to true believers. Non-believers possess no true altruism. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 240 Pa ge 24 1 Because many such claims are contained in religious texts that claim inerrancy, it follows that, should the claim be falsiied, the entire ideology in which the claim is embedded should also fall suspect. In this it can be seen that the claim that science and religion occupy two non-overlapping domains of human experience is tenuous at best. Most religious or mystical ideologies have hundreds of ISC claims that, if conirmed, have the potential to overturn the reign of MN as the default assumption for scientiic inquiry. They have also had several hundred years to build such a case for MSN. They have not done so. Not only has the dark-age notion that ISC is common-place been virtually eliminated from modern consciousness, but subscribers to these ideologies are now demonstrating a desperation for any shred of evidence that can hide the naked truth of their defenseless position. Out of this desperation, single anecdotes offering tenuous evidence for ISC are often heralded as worthy of a paradigm shift to MSN, while statistical studies that show no trace of ISC where it doctrinally should be are dismissed without an appreciation of the strength of such negative evidence. It follows from the intense commitment to an immaterial realm by some individuals that their greatest logical error will be the premature defaulting to an immaterial cause and the non-sequitur that any “unknown” qualiies as evidence for an immaterial ontology until explained materially by proper science. Their aversion to admitting that they do not know prevents them from ending their claims where the evidence ends. It also effectively shuts down scientiic curiosity since at no time are they in honest search of a cause. Another logical error committed by the proponents of ISC is to sweep clean the weighing pans on the equal arm scale of provisional ontology. Prior to the innumerable successes of MN, the pans on this scale were close to balanced, favoring neither MN nor MSN. However, The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 241 Pa ge 24 2 MN’s explanatory and technological successes should logically be allowed to accumulate on the MN pan. The resulting imbalance is dramatic, but fair. Each new search for causation must be approached with the justiied assumption of a material cause. Another tactic that ideologies with ontologies that admit ISC often employ is redeining truth by conducting hermeneutical tweaks in the reading of their ambiguous scriptures as seen in the migrating position of the Catholic Church on astrology. This defensive moving of the goalposts, while no doubt embarrassing, preserves enough respectability to allow for the continued assertion of ISC for phenomena in domains that the expanding web of material causation has not yet reached. There is one other logically possible way for MSN to regain respectability. If the current scientiic paradigm were to begin to inexplicably suffer massive failures, conidence in MN would falter. For example, were there a widely observed apparent violation of the laws of motion and gravity such as the sudden reversal of the moon’s orbit, this would send metaphysical shock waves through the scientiic community. Even if these failures of the dominant paradigm were not predicted by any ideology that subscribed to ISC, this would be a situation in which scientists may need to back away from MN to some appropriate degree to reassess the causal web. However, there would irst need to be a span of time in which other possible material paradigms could be introduce and assessed that could reconcile these apparent failures. If no coherent explanation were forthcoming, it may be time to admit more than just the logical possibility of supernatural causation. If a new theory of immaterial causation that explained the aberrant phenomena could be tested and was consistently replicated, it may carry more weight than the proposal of an extremely improbable and unsupported material cause such as mischievous and technologically advanced space aliens. However, if the theory assigned to the phenomena were not testable, then it would remain at a lower ontological status than even the most improbable The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 242 Pa ge 24 3 logically possible material causal hypothesis. MSN does remain logically possible. However its now remote probability continues to decline as material causation, under the predictive heuristic of MN, progressively ills in the pieces of the causal puzzle across all domains of inquiry. A notable domain is that of cognitive science. Not only are immaterial concepts such as the soul and free will being threatened by recent research, but also the reliability of subjective memory and reporting, long employed as the empirical basis for many claims of ISC, have been brought into question. As the reliability of the intuitive mind begins to show cracks, the importance of applying a rigorous scientiic methodology that removes this subjectivity in the assessment of phenomena becomes increasingly clear. The saving grace for the notion of immaterial causation may ironically be the success of material explanations in extending their reach into domains that are increasingly distant from human intuition. Within the last 100 years, many new theories have been introduced and established that exist at a level of abstraction that exceed the conceptual powers of the average human mind. These include special relativity, general relativity, quantum theory and emergence theory. These theories reside on the outer ring of the causal web and require concepts that are either nonintuitive as they must transcend our innate weakness to correctly assess probabilities, or counterintuitive as is the notion of relative time. For many of these theories, there are no conceptual devices that can translate the essence of the theory into a manageable mental concept. We can speak of the “low” of electrons along a wire to approximate what is actually happening in an electrical current, but the assignment of “lavor”, “spin” and “color” to quarks does not very well relect their essence. Conceptualizing has often surrendered to mere mathematical formulations to justify the theories now being generated and veriied on this frontier. Capitalizing on this limitation, pseudoscience has incorporated the murkier aspects of quantum theory The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 243 Pa ge 24 4 to justify all manner of dubious theories, some in disciplines far above its hard science(6). The web of causal explanations is expanding deeper into the counterintuitive at a pace much greater than our ability to build a conceptual infrastructure on which to intelligibly attach new concepts. Figure 1 illustrates this progression. The average human must resign himself to the fact that there are truths that he may never fully appreciate or understand. As a result, this frontier of counterintuition will continue to breed pseudo-scientiic conjectures that may travel as a contagion across ideologies desperate for a metaphysical lifeboat. While the counterintuitive nature of this distant region of inquiry may seem less hostile to ISC, scientists working this region are not abandoning MN and other proven methods of science. The challenge for them is not only to establish their theories with the proven tools of science, but to also provide as much conceptual accessibly to them as is possible in order to generate subsequent generations of well-equipped and dedicated scientists. In conclusion, MN has proven its worth. The precedent of science’s explanatory and technological successes when implementing MN warrants its continued use. This precedent also relegates ISC to the realm of mere logical possibility, and, as result, offers little expectation of MSN ever emerging as an eficient or productive heuristic in scientiic methodology. In addition, the claims of ISC are subject to scientiic The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 244 Pa ge 24 5 scrutiny, and carry the risk of falsifying their mother ideologies. As science advances into more counterintuitive domains of inquiry, the challenge will be for educators to provide a conceptual framework upon which the average inquisitive mind can conidently climb without abandoning MN and the other proven heuristics that have made science so productive. Notes (1) Philosophical materialism is also known as ontological or metaphysical materialism. (2) “Middle world” is a term biologist Richard Dawkins uses in his lectures to describe the thin stratum of human experience between the very large and very small. While phenomena within this stratum are largely intuitive, exploring the strata on either side often requires counterintuitive conceptualizations. (3) Psalm 104:5 says “the LORD set the earth on its foundations; it can never be moved.” Ecclesiastes 1:5 states “And the sun rises and sets and returns to its place.” (4) Recent studies have shown that one in ive Americans believe the Sun revolves around the Earth (Dean). (5) A notable exception is the $20,000,000 the USA reportedly spent in the seventies and eighties on researching and employing “psychics” as “remote viewers”. (6) In 1994, the theoretical physicist Alan Sokal submitted an essay to Social Text, the leading journal in the ield of cultural studies entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Trans formative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” This essay discussed the “postmodern” philosophical and political implications of twentieth century physical theories. However, Sokal later revealed in the journal Lingua Franca, that the essay was merely a parody attempting to demonstrate the propensity of academic journals to accept works that extended beyond mainstream scientiic notions out of political interests. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 245 Pa ge 24 6 References Byrd, RC. “Positive therapeutic effects of intercessory prayer in a coronary care unit population” Southern Med J 1988;81(7):826-829. Dean, Cornelia. “Scientiic Savvy? In the U.S., Not much.” New York Times 30 Aug. 2005 <http://www. nytimes.com/2005/08/30/science/30proile.html>. Forrest, Barbara. “Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection” Philo Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 2000). Giere, Ronald N. “Modest Evolutionary Naturalism” Biological Theory 1(1):52-60, 2006. Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientiic Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp 2223, 1962. “Tanzania fear over albino killings” BBC News 17 Dec. 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ africa/7148673.stm>. Tessman, Irwin, and Jack Tessman. “Eficacy of prayer: A critical examination of claims” Skeptical Inquirer 2000;24(2):31-33. White, Andrew Dickson. A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom. Kessinger Publishing, 2004. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 246 Pa ge 24 7 Abstract 方法論的自然主義は、科学的方法論における不可欠なヒューリスティクス（発見的方法）とし て、その重要性をますます高めている。同理論を採用した科学の成功例、及び同理論のもたら す制約の効率性を鑑みるに、方法論的自然主義の活用は今後も必要不可欠と考えられる。本稿 においては、方法論的自然主義の出現の歴史、現在の状況と、常に難解かつ反直観的である科 学研究の分野での利用に関する将来的展望について検討する。 Methodological naturalism has increasingly proven its worth as an essential heuristic in scientific methodology. Its continued use is strongly warranted by the precedent of the success of the science that employs it, and the efficiency of its constraints. This paper examines the historical emergence of methodological naturalism, its current status, and future expectations related to its usage in areas of scientific inquiry that are evermore counterintuitive and complex. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent - Phil Stilwell - Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), p. 247 The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justified by Precedent Phil Stilwell This paper was irst published in March of 2009. It may be cited as follows. The Status of Methodological Naturalism as Justiied by Precedent; Phil Stilwell; Studies in Liberal Arts and Sciences (Tokyo University of Science), No. 41 (2009), pp. 229-247.