JOAQUIM BRAGA
HYPOTHETICAL THOUGHT IN MANDEVILLE’S
DECONSTRUCTIVE GENEALOGY OF SOCIABILITY*
ABSTRACT. – In the critique he makes of commercial society, Bernard Mandeville
often resorts to the use of conjectures about the origins of human nature, and
it may even be said that without them, it would not be possible to substantiate
the reasons for such critique. Two of the main targets of this paper are, precisely, to show how Mandeville’s hypothetical thought supports the critical
observation that eighteenth-century society makes about itself, and, at a purely theoretical level, to point out the similarities and differences that bind it to
the so-called “conjectural history”.
There is, in all the Mandevillean oeuvre, a clear attempt, repeatedly
reiterated by its author, to describe and criticize the evolution of
social life according to the principles of empirical observation. Focusing largely on the observation of human passions and their forms
of expression, allows Bernard de Mandeville to exceed the artifices
of imagination and to reinforce reason with the true reality of life in
society. The fact that The Fable of the Bees begins with the satirical
poem The Grumbling Hive already shows the author’s concern to
“naturalize” his observation method. Putting aside a purely theoretical approach, based solely on ideal assumptions, he
*
This work received financial support from FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia) funds through POPH/FSE/EU. To all financing sources the author
is greatly indebted.
«I castelli di Yale online», IV, 2016, 2, pp. 145-159. ISSN: 2282-5460
I castelli di Yale • online
views the life forms of the commercial society of his time. It is from
nature, in other words, that reason is built, and not the reverse. The
claim of this maxim is intrinsically programmatic. Mandeville comes
into his own as an anatomist of society: he fights against all the fictions that obscure self-knowledge, aiming to show human beings for
«what they really are», rather than as «what they should be». (MANDEVILLE 1988, 1, p. 39). In his thought, these two modalities issue in a
paradoxical tension between the primordial dimensions of the state
of nature and the artificial dimensions of civil society, a tension invariably sustained by his criticism of morals and the semantics of
virtue and good-manners of the eighteenth-century commercial
society. This paradoxical tension between “natural” and “artificial”
derives, in part, from the hypothetical character that pervades the
anatomical thought of Mandeville and the several conjectural contents derived from it. Hence, the question of what is the true nature
of men – what they really are – appears, inevitably, linked to the
hypothetical reconstruction of the past, and may be expressed in
the question what must have been the case.
It is thus inside this temporal bond of the present with the past
that the objectification of human self-knowledge takes place,
whereas reference to the future appears more concerned with the
moral codification of society. As the moral virtues conceal more
than properly reveal, Mandeville proposes a genealogy of sociability
that has the capacity, in the long run, to rebuild the natural principles of human behavior and deconstruct the delusive myths that
have been imposed on it. The latter purpose, of course, is inextricably linked to the author’s satirical vein. By exposing in the past all
that is condemned in the present, all that is socially repressed and
disciplined, it becomes feasible for him to caricature, simultaneously, the morphologies of his social context. About that, we can even
say that the Mandevillean genealogy of sociability brings together a
certain “jocular ontology”, similar to that found in many William
Hogarth paintings, where those human dimensions hitherto considered ridiculous, rude and tasteless appear now as integral to humankind.
As rightly noted by Frank Palmeri, all these hypothetical reconstructions of Mandeville, far from being mere conjectural elements
scattered throughout his work, served to boost decisively the development of the so-called “conjectural history” in the second half of
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the eighteenth century (PALMERI 2015)1. So John Locke – as afterwards Dugald Stewart and Immanuel Kant – tell us that, in the construction of historical knowledge, conjectures are needed to fill the
gaps left by the absence of reliable information, especially documented fact, thus making feasible the expansion of time’s history
and the narrative sequentiality of its own events. Nevertheless, Kant
cautions that history cannot be traced only by the conjectural history, since, if that was the case, it quickly would become a mere novelistic fiction. The origins of human action must therefore be drawn in
accordance with the natural dispositions of human beings – and this
is a speculative exercise in which the surveillance of reason must
impose on the imagination itself (KANT 1963).
The conjectural history of the eighteenth century sought to take
a secular view of the primitive origins of human life that led to artificial forms of civil society. Therefore, that the main goal of the paths
of conjectural history has been the reconstruction of the state of
nature and, in its most anthropological versions, the imposition of a
normative gap between barbarism and civilization, seem to be an
unmistakable fact. Kant, for example, will use historical and conjectural hypothetical thought to draw out the emancipation of man
from his natural instincts and passions. But, once attained, the Enlightenment cultural ideals of Bildung, of society and of its major
institutions are now described through purely rational principles,
which, in turn, exclude the somatic dimensions of individuals in the
realization and understanding of their actions. Western thought,
fully bonded to this new theoretical trend, conceived those phenomena associated with the body and its less conventional expressions as mere ethnographic traces, primitive and exotic, provided by
oral cultures, devoid of written language and fully articulated laws.
One of the major philosophical manifestations of such a trend –
whose influence is felt in the recognition and development of aesthetics as an autonomous philosophical discipline – is, precisely, the
debate on judgments of taste. Whether David Hume or Kant embraced the project to find a solid foundation for the appreciation of
beauty, with the main objective of regulating the natural dispositions of perception and emotions, and thereby make beauty a
1
For comments about this influence of Mandeville in the eighteenthcentury philosophy, see, for example STEPHEN 1976, vol. II, 40.
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properly communicable fact. The rationalization of passions and the
formation of good taste are the two major steps that, supported by
aesthetic theory and the artistic production itself, were given to
distinguish the Hochkultur from the so-called “primitive culture”.
However, given these theoretical directions that conjectural history normally has followed, it is appropriate here to ask if the same
teleological dimension well represented by Kantian conjecturalism
also forms the basis of the Mandevillean hypothetical thought. Or
rather, put as a question, is really the intention of Mandeville to use
conjectures as a product of hypothetical thought only for the purpose of narrating the origins of humanity and its major social institutions and thereby overcome the narrative breaks of historical discourse?
As can be inferred from the explanations of Dugald Stewart on
the work of Adam Smith, conjectural history – theoretical history or,
in its French version, histoire raisonnée – works as a method of
comparison between uncultivated and civilized worlds4. Historical
conjectures, given the impossibility of reliable documentary sources
and also instruments of symbolic mediation of the facts, are able to
rebuild a natural scenario, which embraces the emergence of organized society and its major institutions. Thus, this natural scenario
has in it already projected the absence of a symbolically mediated
factuality, and shows, so to speak, a kind of “symbolic void” of the
unrepresentable, leaving open only the door to the formulation of
hypotheses typified by the question “what must have been the
case”. Mandeville does not put in question the method of conjectural comparison. Where he differs, however, is in refusing to weave
a compliment to – or to lay on a panegyric of – the progress of the
so-called civilized society. Rather, what we find in his thought is the
idea that the origins of society show us what gradually was denied
by society and hidden from all humankind. As he asserts, «all Nations must have had mean Beginnings; and it is in those, the Infancy
of them, that the Sociableness of Man is as conspicuous as it can be
ever after»(MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 180). The (conjectural) origins
of the main social institutions – such as, for instance, religion, justice, the state – are used by Mandeville in order to evaluate and
specify their functions. As the “function” does not always make visible the “origin”, the typical author of conjectural history intends to
highlight the major steps that embrace the birth and the develop148
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ment of each institution, particularly those phases where there is an
initial transparency between the spheres of the individual and the
society. This aim is rather central to Mandeville, since it allows him
to form the discursive basis for the fierce satire of the deceptive
behavior of his contemporaries – such behavior is, indeed, well represented by the moral claims of the Societies for the Reformation of
Manners.
Mandeville differs, then, from many other authors in foregrounding an inevitable and implicit tension between knowledge of the
origins of human society and pride in its present social status. Human beings generally reveal, as he sees it, deceptive behavior in
relation to their natural origins. And this paradox is expressed by
him in the following terms: «We see likewise that Men, who are
come to be great in the World from despicable Beginnings, don’t
love to hear of their Origin» (ibid., 301). As he metaphorically puts
it, the human being no more likes to recognize or acknowledge what
enabled his rise as a social being than an architect wishes to remove
the scaffolding before he has finished his building (ibid., 303). And
here, at this particular point, Mandeville does form an assertive
critique of the historians themselves, since, if the man «was made
of a Lump of Earth» (MANDEVILLE 1732, 131), there is no reason for
the likes of them who study the origin of Ancient Rome, to put out
of sight the true nature of human beings. Given this premise, deceptive behavior increases when the individual exhibits a higher civilized level (MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 303). On the other hand, and
here is one of the main principles of Mandeville, the passions of
civilized man obstruct the reconstruction of the state of nature,
since in this they show strong simplicity and weak pleasure levels –
then these characteristics are unable to be fully imagined by individuals who saw their passions fragmented and multiplied by pleasure and luxury. The greater the degree of social composition of human passions, the lower the degree of their analytical determinability. The anatomist of society is more precisely one who is able to
dissect the main physiological structures that are at the core of each
compound of passions. Mandeville’s aim is always to find how basic
emotions give rise to the articulation of more complex impulses.
The issue of “simulation”, presented here – and which, as we
know, runs through the Mandevillean criticism of the social hypocrisy of commercial society – has an almost pathological effect on the
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formation of a primordial explanation of human nature. One way to
provide an origin of human life that keeps most humans away from
their true passions lies, precisely, according to Mandeville, in the
creationist theories of the universe. All religious explanations of the
origin acquire a primacy on natural causes, since, being «more
agreeable to good Sense», they attribute to the origin an «incomprehensible creative Power» that arose from one transcendent
force (ibid., 316). However, and as in other cases in which society
tends to create fictions about itself, even such an “incomprehensible” aspect of the divine hides what is most natural in man. Both
negative determinations of their environment – which, according to
the influence of Hobbesian thought in Mandeville, potentiate fear
and make this passion a turning point for the establishment of an
invisible power, especially one connected to religion – as their vicious imperfections are originating impulses for the creation of arts,
sciences, commerce, and the social institutions in general. Without
all these imperfections and negative determinations – the «Evil» in
the ordinary language adopted by Mandeville – the very existence
of the social nature of human being would be compromised to the
point where it can be destroyed. With this view also quickly becoming blurred some points that mark the society development ideals
fixed in those artificial divisions between primitive stage and civilized stage.
Contrary to the hypocritical pretensions of commercial society
and in the same line of the hypothetical reasoning which will subsequently be followed, for example, by the Scottish historian William
Robertson2, Mandeville believes that «there is no Difference between the original Nature of a Savage, and that of a civiliz’d Man:
They are both born with Fear» (MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 214). This
last assertion must be still contextualized within Mandeville’s theory
of the passions. Fear or other basic human passions are, strictly
2
Robertson does not establish a normative basis, anchored on the anthropological binomial “barbarian-civilized”, to his conjectural formulations. As
Mandeville, also he believes that human nature, no matter how socially
evolved, always remains unchanged in its genesis: «A human being, as he
comes originally from the hand of nature, is everywhere the same. At this first
appearance in the state of infancy, whether it be among the rudest savages, or
in the most civilized nation, we can discern no quality which marks any distinction or superiority» (ROBERTSON 18009, vol. 2, 221).
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speaking, structurally unchanged, with only substantial differences
in how they are integrated with each other – the integration potentially giving rise to the properly social passions, for example, hypocrisy. David Hume seems to share the same view when he asserts
that «Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity,
public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world,
and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which
have ever been observed among mankind» (HUME 2007, 75). Like
Mandeville, also, he follows the maxim that human nature – particularly the passions – has a uniform and unchanging character, not
being therefore fully affected by the cultural determinations and
impositions of each nation. Such a maxim makes it possible to defend conjectural history as an inquiry into the genealogical principles that sustain the basis of social life and the main human social
institutions, because, as the philosopher points out, «Mankind are
so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of
nothing new or strange in this particular» (ibid., 76). Human nature
thus presents since its beginnings an unwavering physiological and
psychological determinism, regardless of the several regional, climatic, religious circumstances that are imposed to every nation in
the world. So, concludes Mandeville, we should not expect major
significant changes in this regard (MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 1, 229).
However, owing to the hybrid forms that passions can assume within a society, it is not always easy to determine their most intrinsic
elements.
Before the beginning of the eighteenth century, there already existed a significant European debate on the psychological causes of
human behavior and its importance for the understanding of historical phenomena. For some authors, a history built by and for the
memory was a true obstacle to such implication. In his writing De
l'usage de l'histoire, Abbé de Saint-Réal, for example, tells us that
historical knowledge should not only have a mnesic purpose, since
to know the events of the past is to know their causes right through
the motives and passions of man. Only the passionate motives are
able to allow full knowledge of the human spirit, and not alone the
facts that are them purely external (ABBÉ DE SAINT-RÉAL 1671, 3-4). In
a similar vein, in Mandeville’s usage, conjectures are, in most cases,
to establish the “principles which Men act from”. But, as a good
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empiricist, Mandeville always advocated that human knowledge
comes only from the facts of sensation and perception. «All our
Knowledge comes a posteriori», and, therefore, adds the author, «it
is imprudent to reason otherwise than from Facts» (MANDEVILLE
1988, vol. 2, 261). Knowledge a priori is only a privilege of God, being the common man condemned to accept the uncertainties derived from his reasoning a posteriori.
From this human inability redounds a clear opposition between
“works of art” and “works of nature”. While, for Mandeville, the last
are unchanging in its stability and wholeness – both impossible to
be absolutely understood by reason and by human senses –, the
former, due to the imposition of our knowledge a posteriori, «are all
very lame and defective», and therefore require a gradual improvement over time (ibid., 186-187). And this idea help us to confirm the inferences that Mandeville made from the thought of John
Locke, namely that rationality is not just innate to human beings,
but, being an explicitly temporal process, always requires various
levels of evolution and practice. However, Mandeville's empiricism
does not prevent him, of course, from questioning the origins of
human nature and its social implications, as well as making use of
hypothetical thought when there are no clear empirical facts to go
on. Because, as he insists, «it is not possible to know any thing, with
Certainty, of Beginnings, where Men were destitute of Letters»
(ibid., 231). Through the mouth of Cleomenes, Mandeville also confesses that «When Things are very obscure, I sometimes make Use
of Conjectures to find my Way» (ibid., 128). But this use of hypothetical thought is, according him, devoid of a purely epistemic purpose, and is, consequently, not (as later projected by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau) a proper mean to découvrir la vérité (ROUSSEAU 1755).
Mandeville admits that its use should not, under any circumstances,
jeopardize the use of rational capacities themselves. As it can be
seen in the following excerpt taken from the Third Dialogue between Horatio and Cleomenes:
HOR.
Do you argue, or pretend to prove any thing from those Conjectures?
CLEO.
No; I never reason but from the plain Observations which every body
may make on Man, the Phænomena that appear in the lesser World
(MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 128).
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With this, we find here a reason to justify and differentiate the
use of hypothetical thought in Mandeville. It shows, at the same
time, the creative force and the mysterious works of nature, as well
the total inability of the human mind to have a completely and utterly objective view of them. With this stress on the inscrutability of
the first causes, Mandeville intends precisely to reinforce the idea of
knowledge a posteriori, particularly based on a thorough, empirical
observation typical of his narrowly anatomical method. “Observation” means, in this semantic context, an analysis form strictly social
– that is, socially rooted –, whose main empirical support is the
outward signs that each body reveals to every body. In this sense,
Mandevillean observations are, above all, true interactions between
observer and observed; the theoretical framework of his hypothetical formulations is not allegedly made of scientific abstract concepts, but rather of the bodies of both; and the theory itself returns,
so to speak, to the Greek etymology of the “contemplation” in loco.
As it can be inferred from the semiotics of Charles Sanders
Peirce, the hypothetical thought, typical of abductive processes,
enables us to form suggestive explanations about something that,
being outside the range of our senses, does not have a particular
factual dimension. Because it involves, strictly speaking, a protological reasoning (not yet fully conditioned by inferential rationality), we owe to this way of thinking the equation of “new ideas”. In
this regard, Peirce tells us that this kind of natural intelligence is
similar to animals’ instincts, and can be, hence, described as a form
of thought that carries in itself the “rational instinct” of human beings. “Instinct” because abductive suggestions are a kind of «flash»,
«an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight» (PEIRCE
1934, vols. V-VI, 113), which, as in all instinctual manifestations,
reveal that something may be the case; “Rational” because the development of conjectures always strongly depends on evaluations
and selections of the several possibilities in play.
This analogy between instinct and conjecture drawn by Peirce allows us better to understand the naturalistic character that pervades the Mandevillean hypothetical thought. In Mandeville, this
mental model of the hypothetical thought is mirrored, in an evident
way, in his own conjectures about the origin of human nature. And
this is a significant fact that pervades the whole work of Mandeville.
There is, here, in this particular aspect, a clear symmetry between
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form and content, between thought and subject. So, too, in The
Fable of the Bees there exists a latent symmetry between its satirical
vision and the social vision of the period. At this point, it should be
stressed again that Mandeville's conjectures are almost always naturalistic projections of empirical observations that the author makes
of certain social behaviors, certain expressions of human emotions
as well as the animal's own behavior, and even the entirely natural
life. Mandeville’s use of hypothetical thought is a truly intuitive use,
which does not depend either of any widespread speculation about
the origins of the concerned phenomena, nor about the geographic
location of them. Instead – and as the author tells us about the political inventions –, he goes «directly to the Fountain Head, human
Nature itself», intending thereby to investigate «the Frailty or Defect in Man, that is remedy’d or supply’d by that Invention» (MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 28). Thus, this naturalistic conjectural method of
Mandeville can later be found in the observations of Dugald Stewart
on the thought of Adam Smith, particularly when the author states
that «when we cannot trace the process by which an event has
been produced, it is often of importance to be able to show how it
may have been produced by natural causes» (STEWART 1829, 31).
Owing to his empirical method Mandeville gradually objectified
these natural causes with respect to human life. Such research must
always bear the various stages in the lives of individuals, from birth
to death, since the psychology of human mind is formed and revealed over time in an interpolated way.
Mandeville’s hypothetical thought has, in this sense, and to a
large extent, a very explicit analogical profile. Statements on human
sociableness like these, «Nature had design’d Man for Society, as
she has made Grapes for Wine» (MANDEVILLE 1988, vol. 2, 185), and
«we have more Reason to imagine that the Desire as well as Aptness of Man to associate, do not proceed from his Love to others,
than we have to believe that a mutual Affection of the Planets to
one another, superiour to what they feel to Stars more remote, is
not the true Cause why they keep always moving together in the
same solar System» (ibid., 178), inhabit the speculative universe of
the author, as well as its rhetorical form. Thus, if we consider this
naturalistic basis, Mandevillean conjectures tend to have a “deistical
dimension”, since, devoid of providential action and historical transformation, they expose change within a natural psychological
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framework, in which the passions prevail as true causes of human
sociability. However, unlike the “deistical histories”3, Mandeville
does not cease to give importance to the correlation of passions
with the economic mechanisms of the social system. In fact, it is
these same passions – particularly those influenced by luxury and
“vicious” behaviors – that underpin the economic system of commercial society. Without them, it would be difficult to sustain commercial dynamics able to ensure the enrichment of the great nations, it would be difficult, too, to provide a common well-being for
citizens, governable only by state laws. As well evidenced in the
poem The Grumbling Hive, frugality only leads to the creation and
governance of small communities, closed in themselves, without
any propensity for openness to the world. It is, on the contrary, the
excessive passions, triggered by the desire of luxury, those that
nourish and reproduce the sphere of social relationships of powerful
nations. In these, prodigality brings forth a structural isomorphism
between human relations and trade relations, to the point of ceasing to be a clear line of demarcation between them. If there isn’t
any distinction here, there will also not be an intermediate point to
introduce a regulation, based on purely ethical principles and values, of the two interactive forms. That is why moral and good manners only survive in the social imaginary at the expense of a kind of
collective mise en scène – largely supported by hypocrisy – of human behavior. Despite this point of view, we must not confuse the
influence of vicious behavior in the social sphere with that of the
individual sphere. These are, strictly speaking, two different planes.
According to Mandeville, any man can adopt virtuous behavior even
when he is a citizen of a rich kingdom. The reverse, however, can
not be claimed. No powerful nation is able to exclude human vices
and continue to subsist in its magnitude for any length of time.
In the search for explanatory principles that justify man’s social
behavior, as well as the role of social institutions, Mandeville is
forced to reverse almost all relationships that had until his day been
attributed to the binomium “natural-artificial”. Supporting such
programmatic reversal is the well know Mandevillean maxim that
«Men become sociable, by living together in Society» (MANDEVILLE
1988, vol. 2, 189). It is following this maxim that the author departs
3
About the conjectural features of “deistical history”, see, for example, EM-
ERSON 1984.
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from both the conception defended by Shaftesbury that human
beings have, ab aeterno tempore, a common social profile, like the
radical Hobbesian conception that eliminates any natural disposition
for sociability. Quite to the contrary. For Mandeville, the natural
condition of human beings enables, step by step – and entirely
spontaneously – the common sociability of mankind, not being
therefore either the artifices of virtue or moral, nor the linguistic
competence, those who genuinely begin to raise the man to the
condition of social being. In Friedrich August von Hayek's view, the
“spontaneous order” introduced by Mandeville leads to the idea of
an open historical evolution, devoid of any project determined a
priori (HAYEK 1996). From this point we can also infer that one consequence of the conjectural versions of the origin of society redounds, in Mandeville, in an exclusion of the predictive devices of
historical science.
Before the third step he attributes to life in society – that which
occurs with the invention of writing, and, by extension, with the
development and establishment of laws – there are two other previous major steps involving the instincts of preservation and competition, from which result a propulsion to union and social order:
“preservation” of mankind against the dangers posed by wild animals; “competition” among men, mainly motivated by pride and
ambition. Through the conjectures about the origin of sociableness
it is possible to discern the primacy of the passions on human rational activity (these, in fact, never cease to determine all the various manifestations of social life, even those that concern the law,
the political sphere and the moral behavior of individuals). In this
narrow sense, rationality, as can be inferred from Mandeville, is a
kind of circular calculus dictated by passions and imputed to the
passions themselves. One of the aspects that confirm this Mandevillean idea lies in the conjectural formulation about the origins of
language. In Mandeville, as somewhat similarly in Étienne Bonnot
Condillac too, language, not being derived from any providential
invention, has to be approached from through its natural elements.
These natural elements are given essentially by action and not, conversely, by reflection. The first signs have a symptomatic performative dimension, generated by the expression of basic passions and
instinctive gestures. And it is for the use of the action that language
has, since its first manifestations, a persuasive purpose.
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In short, the Mandevillean conjectures on the origin of human
organized life have, in general, an implicit counterfactual dimension
of psychological order: they suppose a certain innateness of human
passions, whose effect prevails throughout human life and that can
only be concealed by social life. With the term “counterfactual” I do
not want to illustrate here those cases of “conditional counterfactual” – if it had been the case that, then... –, although they can also be
found in Mandeville, as, for example, the poor and ascetic society of
bees that in the verses of The Grumbling Hive is suggested by the
author as the opposite model of commercial society. Counterfactuality should already be seen as a structural and implicit dimension of
conjectural thought, since, regardless of the ideological content that
determines it, it is only possible with the suspension of those historically documented facts pertaining to the past and the present of
society. Looking beyond the facts therefore calls for the negation of
intelligible reality, the assumption that, for example, before the
creation of language, human beings had forms of transparent communication, fully natural, that are the opposite of the persuasive
essence of discourse in general. The non-artificial approach of the
past appears to us as well, as a prerequisite for its degree of conjecturability. Moreover, the nature of the passions, in Mandeville’s
view, already has in itself a sort of natural counterfactuality in potentia, which competes – though unavailingly – with the counterfactual artificial imposition of moral and political laws. In so far as the
development of social life goes toward the suppression or concealment of its expression, the passions never get to fully adhere to the
facts, keeping up, therefore, as authentic and transparent sources of
the observation of human sociableness. Already laws, as much as
moral standards, are deceptive by their very nature, since the virtuous behavior they require can only be achieved through a self-denial
of basic passions. Hence, also, that vice, contrary to virtue, is, for
Mandeville, one of the fundamental aspects that reveal the human
passions in their most natural state.
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